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ABSTRACT

An abstract of
o f the dissertation of
o f Kyung-Sup Kim for the Doctor of
o f Philosophy in

Public Administration and Policy presented February 14, 1997.

Title: State Funding for Special Education in Oregon: Calculating Cost
Differentials of
o f Special Education for Handicapped Students in Oregon
School Districts

A general principle of
o f school finance is that the cost of
o f the educational
program is influenced by varying characteristics of
o f students and school districts.
This raises thr
the question of
o f whether state allocation policies should reflect the
additional costs associated with particular educational programs, such as special
education for handicapped students, vocational, compensatory, bilingual education,
and gifted and talented education programs as well as cost differences associated
with size, salaries, and related issues. Thus, it is essential for state government to
identify cost differentials for special education programs in terms of
o f various school
districts to determine the importance of
o f such differences and the possibility of
of
adjusting formulas to reflect these differences.
Higher levels of
o f government intervene for special education in terms of
o f social
justice and social stability. The state of
o f Oregon has a special interest, due in part to

Measure 5, in identifying methods for allocating funds to support special education.

There are several approaches to estimate cost differences due to special education.
education,
such as the resource-cost model and the resource-input methodology. Among the
various methods for calculating the additional costs ooff special education,
education. a cost
function method has the potential to adjust for educational outcomes. However,
However.
estimating a cost function presents substantial empirical problems.
In this study I estimate the additional cost ooff special education for
handicapped students among Oregon school districts using a cost function method.
In this process, by controlling for certain variables in a cost function, estimates of
how locally specific characteristics, such as economies of
o f scale, affect costs are
investigated as well.
The empirical results based on the 128 school districts show that there is no
statistically significant evidence of
o f a relationship between educational outcome and
educational costs. The results are more consistent with an interpretation that schools
spend the money available than they are with an interpretation that expenditures
create well-defined impacts on measures of
o f school performance. It implies it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to apply a cost function method to determine appropriate
state aid levels.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH PROBLEM

A general principle in financing education is that the cost o f the educational
program is influenced by varying characteristics o f students and school districts.
Providing the same resources for all students and all school districts will not ensure
that educational programs are adequate or equitable. Some argue that state
allocations should reflect the additional costs associated with particular educational
programs, such as special education for handicapped or talented and gifted children,
vocational, compensatory, and bilingual education. Others look at cost differences
associated with size, salaries, and related issues.
With enrollments of over 5 million students,1 the development and
implementation o f special education programs for handicapped students and related
issues o f special education are one major task in the public education area. The costs
and financing o f special education have been the most important issues in special
education over the past several years.

1Parrish. Thomas B. “Special Education Finance: Past. Present and Future." Journal
o f Education Finance (vol. 21. 1996). p.451.

The financing o f special education is a cooperative effort between the federal
government, the state government, and the local school district, reflecting the multi
leveled education finance and policy system in the United States. In an egalitarian
society, the rationale for the intervention o f high levels o f government for special
education is based on some notion o f social justice. “In the interest o f social justice
and social stability, unlike the equal per pupil expenditure doctrine, the education
resource must be designed to compensate for imbalances in social arrangements, and
tied to the achievement o f a legitimate social end that is the neutralization of the
negative effects o f rigidities in the social system.”2
Before the 1960s, federal aid to education was marginal at besi; withholding
it provided only limited sanctions to more recalcitrant governments. “In 1975.
Congress enacted the Federal Education for All Handicapped Children Act, P.L. 94142 3. This federal program essentially made access to a free education program a
legal right o f all children. To receive any federal education dollars, states had to
provide appropriate special education services to all handicapped children.”4
Although federal aid never reached projected levels, funding was authorized under

'H odge, Michael V. “ Improving Finance and Governance o f Education for Special
Population,” in Jordan. K. F. and N. H. Cambron-McCabe (eds.), Perspectives in
State School Support Programs (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981),
p.3-38.
This Act was recently renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).
4Odden, Allan R. and Lawrence O. Picus. School Finance : A Policy Perspective
(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1992). p.215.

the act based on each state's number o f children with disabilities who received
special education, adjusted by a percentage o f the national average per-pupil
expenditure.
Despite federal assistance for special education, substantial authority and
control in this area have historically been entrusted to the local government. Yet the
events o f the last two decades reflect a greatly augmented state role in financing,
developing, and maintaining programs for special education students. This is
because: (1) State governments are responsible for administering federally funded
special education programs: (2) States determine education policy, operation
procedures, teacher certification requirements, and classification o f special education
children; (3) States provide financial aid and implement various funding
mechanisms to distribute aid to localities to support the complex educational needs
of handicapped students.5 Thus, the state has a significant interest in identifying
methods for allocating funds to support programs for special education.
States have adopted several different mechanisms to finance programs for
special-needs students. These strategies are divided into two general approaches.
Under the first approach, full state funding, the state picks up the entire amount o f
excess costs. Under the second approach, the state shares in the excess costs through
one or more mechanisms. Over the long term, it is very difficult for states to fully

5McDonough, John T. and K. Forbis Jordan. “State Funding for At-Risk Programs
and Services : Options and Practices,” in Anthony. Patricia and Stephen L.
Jacobson, (eds.) Helping At-Risk Students (Newbury: Corwin Press. 1992). p.93-94.
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fund all special services. The full state funding approach requires rigorous state
oversight or an audit mechanism. If the state has neither cost controls nor regulatory
guidelines to monitor local programs and their financial needs, state costs could soar.
Traditionally, the State o f Oregon depended heavily on local provision o f
special education finance as well as regular education finance. As a result, some
poor localities with relatively large numbers o f handicapped children6 could not
provide enough programs and services for special education. Also, residents o f those
localities often paid more taxes than residents o f other districts for special education.
Moreover, in Oregon, Measure 5 decreases the ability o f local districts to raise
additional revenue to offset higher costs and shifts most funding to the state level.7
In this sense, the State o f Oregon has a special interest in identifying methods for
allocating funds to support special education.
Two objectives are often stated for state funding for special education. First,
all handicapped students must have access to an adequate level o f special education
regardless o f where they live (adequacy). Second, fiscal disparities among

6According to Special Education: Oregon Administrative Rules (1995), handicapped
children means children who require special education because o f mental, physical,
emotional or learning problems (p. 1).
7According to Oregon Report Card (p. 14-15: Oregon Department of Education.
1995), as a result o f Measure 5, public education in Oregon is shifting from a locally
funded system to a state-funded system. Local property tax dollars traditionally were
O regon's largest source o f funding for local public schools. But Measure 5, the
property tax limitation voters approved in 1990. changed that. Measure 5 phased in
limits on local property taxes, plus the limit falling to $5 per $1,000 o f assessed
valuation in 1995-96. Measure 5 required the state legislature to replace the local
property tax revenue schools lost with state money.

communities due to the cost differentials o f special education must be reduced
(equity). It is not equitable if the taxes that individuals bear in order to have a given
level o f special education services depend on the location o f their economic activities
or if other students must receive fewer services to compensate for the higher cost.
Both objectives can be met, at least to some degree, through elaborate distribution o f
state aid. If this is to be done, it is essential for states to identify differences in the
cost o f special education.
It is widely recognized that the costs o f educating handicapped children are
greater than the costs o f educating non-handicapped children. This is because the
majority o f handicapped children receive special education programs and services in
addition to being enrolled in a regular education program; thus, the total cost o f their
education includes both the cost o f the regular program and the cost o f the special
education programs and services. Also, because most special education classes have
much smaller student/teacher ratios than do the regular classes, the cost per student
for special education greatly increases.
If the state government can identify the additional costs o f special education
per student, the district with the handicapped students can receive more state aid
based on the number of those students. Therefore, the state's objective is to
compensate local school districts for the extra cost o f educating handicapped
students, but this requires estimating how costs differ. Estimating cost differences,
however, is a complicated task. Students have different costs depending on their
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disabilities, and schools may be more or less efficient in providing services. Schools
may make different attempts to compensate for these differences. As a consequence,
school districts may have to raise local taxes or divert resources from other students.
Diversion o f resources would be expected to lower achievement for other students.
The research question is thus how to calculate the additional costs o f special
education for handicapped students among school districts which have different
revenue potential and specific characteristics o f their own. There are a variety of
approaches to estimate cost differences for special education for handicapped
students, such as the resource-cost model and the resource input methodology
approaches.
Estimating a cost function is one o f the methods used to calculate the
additional costs o f special education for handicapped students. Although estimating
a cost function has a potential advantage in calculating cost differentials o f specific
education programs, considering all characteristics o f the school district influencing
the educational cost, it also has a difficulty in terms o f feasibility. For example, it is
difficult to estimate cost differences if the condition o f cost minimization is not met.
Schools may not minimize cost, or there may be no direct relationship between the
money spent and the school output. Difficulties in defining school output as well as
other data problems further complicate the analysis.

7

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The primary objective o f this study is determining whether a cost function
can be estimated and used to determine the additional costs o f special education for
handicapped students among Oregon school districts. If it is possible to estimate
such a cost function, the method can be used to calculate cost differentials o f special
education for handicapped students as well as other specific education programs such
as bilingual or compensatory education. By doing so, the state government could
devise a distribution formula to distribute state money to local school districts more
equitably.

8

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

A literature review o f methods to calculate the additional costs o f special
education for handicapped students as well as a review o f education financing in
Oregon are discussed in the second chapter. An attempt to empirically estimate a
cost function for Oregon school districts is addressed in the next two chapters. In the
third chapter, the methodology and data, including the major differences o f this study
from other similar studies, are addressed. In the fourth chapter, the results o f the cost
function are addressed. The policy issues and conclusions are addressed in the final
chapter.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

METHODS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION FINANCING

States distribute funding for special education services through four basic
funding approaches: resource-based methods; excess cost/percentage reimbursement
formulas; pupil-weighting methods; and other approaches, including flat grants, full
state funding, and combinations o f approaches.8 The use o f the four basic funding
approaches by state are shown in Table 1.

8Verstegen, Deborah A. and Cynthia L. Cox. “State Models for Financing Special
Education,” in Anthony. Patricia and Stephen L. Jacobson, (eds.) Helping At-Risk
Students. (Newbury: Corwin-Press, Inc. 1992). p. 142.
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TABLE l 9
Special Education Finance in the States

State

Current Funding

State

Current Funding
Formula

Formula
Alabama

Other approaches

Montana

Other approaches

Alaska

Pupil-weights

Nebraska

Reimbursement

Arizona

Pupil-weights

Nevada

Resource-based

Arkansas

Pupil-weights

N ew Hampshire

Pupil-weights

California

Resource-based

N ew Jersey

Pupil-weights

Colorado

Other approaches

N ew M exico

Pupil-weights

Connecticut

Reimbursement

N ew York

Pupil-weights

Delaware

Resource-based

North Carolina

Other approaches

Florida

Pupil-weights

North Dakota

Other approaches

Georgia

Pupil-weights

Ohio

Resource-based

Hawaii

Pupil-weights

Oklahoma

Pupil-weights

Idaho

Reimbursement

Oregon

Pupil-weights

Illinois

Resource-based

Pennsylvania

Other approaches

Indiana

Pupil-weights

Rhode Island

Reimbursement

Iowa

Pupil-weights

South Carolina

Pupil-weights

Kansas

Resource-based

South Dakota

Other approaches

Kentucky

Pupil-weights

Tennessee

Resource-based

Louisiana

Reimbursement

Texas

Pupil-weights

Maine

Reimbursement

Utah

Pupil-weights

Maryland

Other approaches

Vermont

Other approaches

M assachusetts

Other approaches

Virginia

Resource-based

M ichigan

Reimbursement

Washington

Resource-based

M innesota

Reimbursement

West Virginia

Other approaches

M ississippi

Resource-based

Wisconsin

Reimbursement

Missouri

Resource-based

W yoming

Reimbursement

9Source: Parrish. Thomas B. “Special Education Finance: Past. Present and Future.”
Journal o f Education Finance (vol. 21, 1996). p.455.

Resource-based funding methods provide state money based on service units
and support services required. States that utilize this funding method allocate a
dollar amount per special education teacher or classroom consigned to special
education instruction (Ibid., 158). The determining factor for state funding is the
level o f resources, such as teaching staff, support personnel, or instructional supplies,
necessary to sustain the desired level o f special education services. Eleven states
currently (1996) use this method in funding special education programs.
Excess cost/percentage reimbursement formulas reimburse localities with
state money for all or part o f the costs o f educating special education students
(Verstegen and Cox 1992, 159). States base the reimbursement on the entire cost of
special education programs or on some portion o f allowable expenditures. Ten states
currently utilize this method in funding special education programs (Parrish 1996,
455).
Pupil-weighting methods provide additional funding beyond that provided for
regular education programs to compensate schools or school districts for the excess
costs associated with educating handicapped students (Ibid., 157). The amount o f
money afforded each pupil in a regular school program determines the base funding
amount, which is given a weight o f 1.00. The base amount is then adjusted by an
additional differential or weight that typically varies across special education
programs according to disability, instructional sendee arrangements, or both. While
several states provide additional assistance for the excess cost o f meeting the needs
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o f handicapped students through weighting schemes that vary by intensity o f service,
some states, such as Oregon, use a single weight for all handicapped students.
Weighted finance systems assume consistency o f children’s needs and school system
costs within single disabilities or instructional arrangements by assigning an average
cost per student or teacher unit (Ibid., 161). Because generally it is not the case,
there may exist inequities between school districts with high (above average) costs
and school districts with low (below average) costs or rural and small districts and
large districts. For example, school districts with high costs will not be compensated
for additional expenditures, creating incentives for under-service and possible
inequities o f educational opportunities due to differences in their ability to pay for
additional uncovered costs, whereas districts with low costs will receive more funds
than are required (Ibid., 161). Thus, weighting methods require an empirical basis
for cost definitions and may encourage labeling o f students if funds are based on
disabling conditions rather than servicing needs (Ibid., 162). Eighteen states,
including Oregon, use a pupil-weights method in funding special education
programs.
Other funding approaches currently exist in the remaining 11 states. These
states either use a flat-grant method, which allocates uniform amounts o f state dollars
per pupil in each special education program; a full-state-funding method, which does
not include local supplements, or a combination o f funding approaches. Eleven
states currently (1996) use these kinds o f funding approaches.

13

Because programs to educate handicapped children are considerably more
expensive than programs to educate non-handicapped children, any state-funding
system for special education is designed to help pay for these additional costs.
Lyons and Jordan (1991) grouped program expenditure methodologies into three
primary types: expenditures per student; determination o f supplemental, replacement,
and common expenditures for programs; and resource-cost models.
In the type o f expenditures per student, the average dollar expenditure per
student is calculated by summing the overall direct expenditures o f a program for a
particular type o f student and indirect expenditures allocated to that program, then
the total expenditures are divided by the number o f students in the program. The
expenditure factors approach is basically the same, but each program area is studied
in depth to calculate an expenditure index. The expenditure index is a ratio o f the
expenditures per student o f a special education program to the expenditures per
student o f the regular education program, and is often referred to as a per-pupil
weight. The limitation o f this methodology is that districts rarely budget expenses
by program. Furthermore, data from different districts usually are not comparable
because they are collected and reported in different ways (Ibid., 435-436).
The second methodology focuses on the supplemental, replacement, and
common expenditures for programs. Supplemental expenditures are those that are in
addition to the regular education program. Replacement expenditures are for those
programs that are substituted for regular education. The procedure to determine
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these expenditures is to total the direct expenditures o f the replacement programs and
deduct those expenditures from those for the regular education program. The
supplemental expenditures are added and then the common expenditures for general
services, such as debt service and district administration, are allocated on a previous
data basis (Ibid., 437). The major difficulty with this methodology is deciding
specifically which regular education programs and services are being replaced.
The third methodology to calculate categorical programs is the resource-cost
model. In this approach, the analysis focuses on specifying,... programmatic terms,
the component o f the educational program to be provided; thus, program
expenditures are explicitly derived from the structure o f the educational program
itself. It is a cost-based funding approach that recognizes differences in the
expenditure o f resources across districts, as well as programmatic differences in
service expenditures across districts (Ibid., 437-438). Hartman and Mitchell (1987)
and Raphael et al.( 1985) calculated additional costs for severely handicapped
students in Oregon based on a resource-cost model approach, in which the student
characteristics and program configurations form the basis for estimating the costs of
special education.
Lyons and Jordan (1991) present the resource-input methodology. This
methodology utilizes human and material resource input data for each program as
base data for the calculation o f the pupil weights. Data are gathered at both the
district and program level under the presumption that central office personnel are not
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always knowledgeable about the actual programs and their allocated resources at the
school level.
Two recently introduced methods, the resource-cost model and the resource
input methodology, are much more advanced methods in terms o f their adjustment
ability depending on districts’ variations in the costs o f educational programming as
well as districts’ differences in tax bases. However, they have two weaknesses, the
requirement o f intensive labor by the state and the disregard o f educational outcome.
In the process o f the stages o f these methods, the state must develop some program
expenditure data such as the cost o f education indices and the program cost
differential. Also these approaches do not consider educational outcome at all.
Because there are differences between expenditure and school output determinations,
the simple consideration o f expenditure differences among school districts without
the consideration o f school output is not enough to adjust districts’ variations.
In this sense, a cost function method, which not only can consider the
difference between expenditure and school output among districts but also is not
labor intensive, is a new addition to calculate cost differentials o f specific education
programs. Recently, Downes and Pogue (1994) calculated additional costs of
educating disadvantaged students in Arizona school districts using the cost function
method.

16

EDUCATIONAL COST FUNCTION

An educational cost function is derived from an educational production
function. A production function describes the maximum level o f output possible
from alternative combinations o f inputs (Monk 1989, 31). Given a production
function and input prices, the cost function is derived. A cost function is defined as
the combination o f inputs that minimize costs for a given level o f output. The
general mathematical expression for a cost function is given as
C = f (Y, P)
where C is schooling cost, Y is a vector o f schooling outputs, and P is a vector of
input prices. It is assumed that local school boards maximize the output subject to a
budget constraint and that local school boards operate in competitive input markets.
The result will be the same as minimizing the cost associated with the production o f
the optimal output. Thus, it is necessary that there be a positive relationship between
educational cost and educational outputs. The empirical studies, however, show this
assumption is not met consistently.
The application o f a cost function method to education has been mostly
restricted to the study of economies o f scale. Cohen (1968) uses cost and production
functions to find economies o f scale in Iowa school districts. He uses incremental
test scores as a proxy for school output but does not use socioeconomic variables as a
control for the test scores. Although the study shows the existence o f significant
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economies o f scale, it does not meet the assumption o f a cost function. Not only is
the regression coefficient o f test score not statistically significant, but also most input
coefficients are not statistically significant (Cohen 1968, 430). As he mentioned, the
most important reason for the lack o f statistical significance for school output and
other input variables is the single measure o f school output (Ibid., 430). Osbum
(1970) uses the cost function to investigate the relationship between expenditure per
pupil and size o f school system in Ohio school districts. He uses test scores as a
proxy for school output and some control variables for the test scores, such as
parents’ education levels. Most independent variables including test score are
statistically significant at a 0.05 or at a 0.01 level. Also, the regression coefficient o f
parents’ education levels, the control variable for the test score, is negative (- 2.75) as
expected, although it is not statistically significant (Osbum 1970, 115).10 His study
shows the existence o f economies o f scale when school size increases from 200 to
2.244 (Ibid., 115). Both Osbum ’s and Cohen’s studies use a single measure of
school output -- test scores. The major difference o f O sbum 's study from Cohen's
study is the inclusion of control variables for school output, which may cause the
different results.
Butler and Monk (1985) investigate the relationship between scale economies
in New York state using the cost function. Their study uses four test scores as a

10A negative coefficient indicates that higher parents' education level causes a lower
cost in education, if all other things are held constant, because educated parents are
more likely to help their children to be educated better than uneducated parents.
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proxy for school output but does not use any socioeconomic variable for the test
scores. The regression coefficients o f the four test scores are not consistent. For
example, not only are some o f them not statistically significant, some o f them are also
negative and statistically significant (Butler and Monk 1985, 375).11 The omission o f
socioeconomic variables for school output may be the major reason for such a result.
The study shows that small school districts realize scale economies as they become
larger (Ibid., 377-378). However, their conclusion cannot be fully acceptable due to
the problematic results o f the cost functions they produced.
Riew (1986) investigates scale economies using a school-level database
developed by the Montgomery County (Maryland) Public Schools. The study uses
school service quality, such as teacher qualifications, the breadth o f school
curriculum, and the professional support staff, as a proxy for school output. It
implies that the higher costs increase school service quality and then it in turn
increases school outcome. Although the regression coefficients o f some school
service quality variables, such as professional support staff (expressed as a ratio o f the
number o f support staff to the number o f regular classroom teachers) and teacher
aides (expressed as a ratio o f the number o f aides to the number o f regular classroom
teachers), are statistically significant (Riew 1986, 439-440), it is doubtful that the
assumption o f the cost function, a positive relationship between schooling cost and

“ The study actually analyzes eight regression coefficients for school outcome,
because it uses two cost functions, one for large school districts and the other for
small school districts
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school outcome, is met. This is because those variables are largely input measures.
An ideal approach to the measurement o f school quality would be to consider output
rather than inp*tt inasmuch as the prime concern in education is not with what we
invest in schools but with what we get out o f them. In other words, the variables
used in this study as the measurement o f school output are not good proxies.
Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) find a relationship between
educational outputs and socioeconomic characteristics in Michigan school districts
by using a cost function method. Their study uses three variables (two types o f test
scores and enrollment) as a proxy for educational output. They regard enrollment as
a variable measuring the quantitative dimension o f the school districts’ output and
two test scores as variables measuring the qualitative dimension. Three
socioeconomic variables, income, education, and safety,12 are used to represent the
socioeconomic characteristics of a district. The signs and magnitudes o f coefficients
representing school output indicate that the data does not violate the cost
minimization assumption (Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong 1991, 516).
Recently, Downes and Pogue (1994) calculated cost differentials o f educating
disadvantaged students in Arizona school districts. They used three test scores as a
proxy for school output but did not use any control variable for the test scores. The

12The idea o f the inclusion o f safety variable is that a safer school environment is
more conducive to learning than a crime ridden environment.
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study shows no statistically significant relationship between expenditure per student
and three test scores (Downes and Pogue 1994, 97-98).
In the process o f the search for efficiency in education, there are various
studies to identify the relationship between overall expenditures per pupil and
achievement through the education production function. For more than 30 years,
education production function studies have attempted to estimate relationships
between the supply o f selected purchased schooling inputs and educational outputs,
controlling for the influence o f various background features. There have been
studies where the output variable is labor market success, as well as studies where
the output is the test score performance o f students. Hanushek (1986) summarizes
the results o f 65 studies which specifically deal with the relationship between
expenditures per pupil and educational outputs. O f the 65 studies, 13 showed
significant positive, and another 25 showed insignificant but positive coefficients
between school expenditures and achievement (Hanushek 1986, 1161-1162).
Many recent production function studies report optimistic results in the sense
that positive relationships are being found between schooling resources and
measured educational outcomes (Monk 1992, 309). For example, Laine et al. (1994.
24) found a stronger relationship between per pupil expenditures and pupil outcomes
than that noted by Hanushek. King and MacPhail-Wilcox (1994, 59) present that the
adequacy, or level o f funding provided, as well as how school personnel take

advantage o f resources decides the relationship between overall spending and
achievement.
Most recently, Hanushek (1996) has reviewed estimates of educational
production functions previously and summarized the most complete results. Table 2
presents the summary o f estimated parameters related to school resources (Hanushek
1996, 54).

TABLE 213
Percentage Distribution o f Estimated Effects o f Key Resources on
Student Performance Based on 377 Studies

Teacher-pupil ratio

Number
of
estimates
277

Teacher education

Resources

Statistically
significant
Positive
N egative

Statistically insignificant
Positive

Negative

Unknown

15

13

27

25

20

171

9

5

33

27

26

Teacher experience

207

29

5

30

24

12

Teacher salary

119

20

7

25

20

28

Expenditure per pupil

163

27

7

34

19

13

Adm inistrative inputs

75

12

5

23

28

32

Facilities

91

9

5

23

19

44

Table 2 shows that, o f the 163 estimates o f the effect o f expenditure per pupil
on student achievement, only 17 percent find statistically significant positive effects
o f increasing expenditures per pupil.
In general, the empirical studies are not consistent in terms o f the relationship
between expenditures per pupil and educational outputs. There are several reasons
for inconsistent results. First, for any individual study, incomplete information, poor
quality data, or faulty research could distort a study's statistical results. Second.

13Source: Hanushek. Eric A. "School Resources and Student Performance." in
Burtless, Gary, (eds.) Does Money M atter? (Washington. D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1996). p.54.

even without such problems, the actions o f school administrators could mask any
relationship. Third, lack o f statistical significance o f any estimates can reflect no
relationship, but it also can reflect a variety o f data problems -- those above and
others such as high correlations among the different measured inputs (Hanushek
1986, 1162-1163). Fourth, because education is a long-term process and students
change schools, it is very difficult to measure educational output in the short term.
Finally, and most importantly, inconsistent results may come from various behaviors
o f school personnel. In other words, unless school administrators or teachers take full
advantage o f resources, higher spending does not guarantee higher student
achievement.
Since the spending behavior is not the same among school districts, it is not
theoretically certain whether the positive relationship between per student
expenditures and educational outputs exists in some specific school or school district.
The best way to know that is to investigate the relationship with empirical data.
The idea o f a cost function estimation is to determine empirically how much
additional money is needed to attain various educational levels under adverse
circumstances. Ideally, it would show the cost o f maintaining a given level of output
as various independent variables are changed.
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SCHOOL FINANCING IN OREGON

The state o f Oregon had a long tradition o f strong local fiscal support of
public schools. For example, the state share o f school expenditures was 27.13 % in
1986-87, which is much lower than the U.S. average o f 50.14 % (Crampton 1988,
266). However, as a result o f Measure 5, public education in Oregon is shifting from
a locally-funded system to a state-funded system. In 1994-95, after the passage of
Measure 5, 48.1 % o f the total budget for public schools came from the state (Oregon
Department o f Education 1994, 14). In this chapter, the history o f Oregon school
finance and the current funding system are discussed.

Basic School Support Fund
Oregon has provided state assistance to local school districts in the form of
the Basic School Support Fund (BSSF) since 1946 (Crampton 1988). In addition to
the basic grant, several categorical grants are distributed, including transportation,
special education, gifted and talented, and bilingual. The basic grant consists of
approved program costs, an equalization component, and a factor for growth and
decline in school district enrollment. Each grant is a cost reimbursement program
based on the prior year's data.
The basic grant for approved program costs represented the largest share
(more than 60 percent of the BSSF), which covered most normal operating

expenditures but excluded transportation, food service, cocurricular activities,
community services, capital outlay, debt service, and expenses for nonresident
students (Ibid., 263). There was no minimum effort provision: all school districts
received approximately 25 percent o f their approved program cost up to $725 per
pupil maximum. Since most school districts spent above the approved program cost,
the basic grant, in essence, was a flat grant per student. Growth and decline factors
reflected adjustments to the basic grant to compensate districts for the costs
associated with increasing and decreasing enrollments that were not captured in a
straight per-pupil reimbursement. In an effort to compensate school districts with
relatively low property wealth, the state distributed equalization grants based on the
formula, which attempted to take into consideration differences in total resources o f
school districts (Ibid., 265). The equalization formula is as follows:

Equalization Grant = Approved Program Cost - State Basic Grant - Other District
Revenues - (Equalization Rate x Adjusted Assessed Valuation)

"Other District Revenues" refers to revenue sources such as federal forest fees.
"Adjusted Assessed Valuation" takes into consideration the computed value o f the
Western Oregon Severance Tax offset and the type o f school district, whether
elementary, high school or unified (K-12). For each school district, an "Equalization
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Rate” is computed that determines the size o f its equalization grant. The formula is
as follows:

District Equalization Rate = District Approved Program Cost per RADM / 100 x
Uniform Rate

where RADM is resident average daily membership.
The “Uniform Rate,” derived by working backwards from the amount of
money allocated to equalization, represents the highest rate per $100 o f approved
program cost that will distribute all equalization dollars (Ibid., 165). Total
apportionment was the sum o f the apportionment for transportation, basic grant,
equalization, and growth or decline.
Among categorical programs, transportation aid is distributed at the rate o f 60
percent reimbursement o f the district’s actual costs two years prior. The other
categorical programs have no matching provision or set reimbursement levels and so
are essentially flat grants.

School Finance under Measure 5
In 1990, Oregon voters passed Measure 5, the most significant school
finance reform in fifty years. Measure 5, in effect, phased down school property
taxes, eliminated local control over school funding, and forced a primarily state-
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funded school system. Prior to Measure 5, Oregon schools were funded primarily by
local property taxes. This local orientation produced an education system with
substantial variation in programs and spending due to a wide range o f property
wealth and local tax effort. Under Measure 5, the property tax that could be
collected for school purposes was limited to 1.5 % o f market value the first year ($15
per $ 1,000 o f assessed value), and it decreased by $2.50 per $ 1,000 each year
thereafter until it was reduced to $5 per $1,000 o f assessed value for the 1995-96
school year (Rufolo 1995, 5). It then remained limited to this rate. M easure 5 cut
local school revenue dramatically and required the state legislature to replace the lost
local property tax revenue with state money.
The legislature decided two things that affect the level and distribution o f
this replacement revenue (Ibid., 5). First, because the measure does not require that
all o f the money lost for each district be replaced, rather that the State’s General
Fund replace the aggregate loss in property tax revenue, the legislature chose other
criteria to determine how this money is allocated. This means that the replacement is
very uneven, with some districts gaining more from the Measure 5 re-allocation than
they lose from reductions in previous property tax revenues and others not receiving
complete replacement. Second, the legislature changed its other source o f school
funding. The State has historically awarded a large amount o f money to schools as
basic school support and this amount was reduced by the State. Measure 5 said
nothing about the level o f basic school support. In the 1990-91 school year, before
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Measure 5 passed, 59.4 percent o f the total budget for public schools came from
local property taxes and 26.2 percent came from the state. In 1994-95, 37.4 percent
o f the budget for public schools came from local property taxes and 48.1 percent
came from the state (Oregon Department o f Education 1995, 14-15).

New School Finance System in Oregon
Under the above circumstances, the 1991 Legislature determined that the
state must equalize school funding. To this end, it created a transition formula for
1991-92 (SB 815) and a permanent “equalized” formula for 1992-93 and thereafter
(SB 814) (Oregon Legislative Revenue Office 1995 #2). However, to avoid the
shock o f an abrupt change, the Legislature limited the shift that could be caused by
applying the new formula in 1992-93. The 1993 Legislature, facing significant
reductions in school funding,14 continued to constrain the permanent formula in
1993-94 and 1994-95. While it allowed some movement towards equalization, it
was at a much slower rate than in 1992-93.
SB 814 created a new State School Fund (SSF). The SSF replaced the Basic
School Support Fund (BSSF) and provided a new formula for distribution o f state aid
to K.-12 education. Since the state is the primary source o f education funding, the

14For the first time ever, Oregon schools operated with fewer dollars than the
previous year. In 1993-94, Oregon schools operated with $2.8 billion, representing a
$58 million cut in actual dollars from 1992-93 (Oregon Report Card. Oregon
Department o f Education, 1994. p.25).
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new formula tries to eliminate the variations in resources among districts that existed
prior to the passage o f Measure 5. The new formula is based on the following
principles (Oregon Legislative Revenue Office 1995 #2, 2):
1. The formula determines the total operating funds available to each district
from all sources.
2. Differences in funding are based on differences in costs that are not
within district control. In other words, the new formula considers the cost
rather than the expenditure. The actual formula uses three different
methods to adjust for cost differences (weighted student counts, teacher
experience adjustment, and transportation grant).
3. The state aid is distributed to schools in a lump sum rather than as
categorical grants for particular education programs.
4. The formula avoids factors that create an incentive to classify students or
design programs to increase funds received from the state.

In short, every district should get the same amount per student, adjusted only for
unavoidable differences in costs. Basically, the state aid to a district is calculated as
base funding per student, which is the same for all districts, times weighted student
count (weighted total average daily membership based on student cost weight), plus
transportation grant,15 then minus local revenues. Base funding per student was set

15The transportation grant is the 60 % transportation reimbursement.
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by law at $4,500. However, this figure must be factored up or down depending on
the state appropriation and other funds available for allocation by the formula.16
Also, the teacher experience adjustment is added to the base funding per student.
This factor increases (or decreases) each district’s base funding per student by $25
for each year the district’s average teacher experience exceeds (or fall short of) the
state-wide average.17 The student counts begin with average daily membership
(ADM). The ADM count is then adjusted to reflect the differences in cost o f
educating different types o f students. For example, a special education student
receives a cost weight o f 2.0. In effect, he or she is counted as 2 students. Table 3
shows the weights in the permanent formula (Oregon Legislative Revenue Office
1995 #2, 4-5).

16The amount o f base funding per student was not fully set in the actual distribution
o f the money due to the maintenance o f hold-harmless level as shown later.
17Virtually all school districts have pay schedules based in part on teacher
experience. Incorporating this into a student weight is problematic, so an adjustment
factor is added to the base funding per student. However, due to the maintenance o f
hold-harmless level, this factor was not fully applied to the actual distribution o f the
money. In other words, the distribution formula does not use this factor for all school
districts.

TABLE 3
Student Cost Weights

ADMw
Special education

2.0

English as second language (ESL)

1.5

Students in poverty

1.25

Union High students

1.2

Elementary district students

0.9

Remote school
Pregnant and parenting students18

1 .0 -2 .0
2.0

Note : maximum weight 3.0 for one student
•

A district must get approval o f the Department o f Education to qualify more than
11 % o f its students for the special education weight.

•

The poverty count is based on census data on the number o f children in poverty
families, in foster homes, and in facilities for neglected and delinquent children.
Because the poverty count does not identify students, it is not a factor in applying
the 3.0 weight limit.19

lsThe pregnant and parenting factor was not a part o f the original funding formula
bill. It was added later as a part of the bill and was effective from the 1992-93
distribution.
19The State receives the unrestricted grant for the students living in poverty from the
federal government, then distributes it to school districts as part o f formula (Oregon
Report Card. Oregon Department o f Education 1994. p.38. 54).

•

Elementary districts are those that do not offer a high school. Data shows that
these districts typically spend less than the average per student while the union
high schools spend more than the average.20

•

Students enrolled in a remote small (250 or fewer students) school receive a
higher weight up to a maximum o f 2.0. The smaller the school, the higher the
weight. To qualify, elementary schools must be more than 10 miles and
secondary schools more than 15 miles from the nearest school. Although the
weight is based on the size o f each school, not the size o f a school district, the
remote school factor is intended to reflect economies o f scale among school
districts.

One interesting thing is the use o f census data to count the number of students in
poverty families. It could result in an inaccurate weight for students in poverty in the
later part o f the decade, because the census is updated every ten years.21 The 1995
Legislature allowed the Department o f Education to adjust the census data based on
participation in reduced price lunch programs (Oregon Legislative Revenue Office
1995 #3-95, 5). However, it is desirable to use the common criteria, such as the

20The union high and elementary weights are designed to shift funds between these
districts without affecting the total available in the geographic area. These weights
are intended to be temporary because the 1991 Legislature required these districts to
merge into unified (K-12) districts by 1996-97.
z lIn the actual distribution formula, the cost weight for students in poverty is based
on 1990 census data.

number o f students who receive free or subsidized lunch to count the number o f
students in poverty, rather than the adjustment.
This formula became partially effective in 1992-93. It was to fully take effect
in 1995-96 (except for the remote school factor), but currently (1997) it does not
fully take effect. Four temporary formulas have been used to allocate funds from
1991-1995 (Oregon Legislative Revenue Office 1995 #2, 6-8).
In 1991-92, the State continued the pre-Measure 5 distribution o f school
revenue to avoid the shock o f a sudden change. Each district received the basic aid
based on the old BSSF formula. $167.4 million (the balance o f the total
appropriation) replaced revenue losses caused by Measure 5. Early computer
simulations indicated that the appropriation would replace about 88.5 % o f the loss.
But increases in assessed values decreased the losses. So each school district
received at least as much revenue from state aid and property taxes as it did in 199091.
Although the 1991 Legislature adopted the new permanent formula effective
in the 1992-93 fiscal year, it would have created very large increases for lowspending districts and similar decreases for high-spending districts to implement the
permanent formula immediately in 1992-93. Thus the Legislature decided to
dampen the changes. So. although they put the formula into effect, they constrained
its operation. For 1992-93 only, no district could receive less general operating
revenues than the prior year and no district could receive an increase of more than 25
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%. In effect, this gave low-spending districts substantial increases (up to 25 % over
1991-92) while freezing the total funds o f higher-spending districts. When
accompanied with an appropriation that increased total K-12 funding by over 8 %
despite a decline in property tax revenue, the main effect o f this was to “equalize up"
many districts into much closer parity with other districts. In addition, the highspending districts were “equalized down" somewhat because they were given no
allowance for inflation or enrollment growth. The practical impact o f the 1991 -92
and 1992-93 distribution changes was to cut the district-to-district variation in
operating revenue per student by almost half compared to the pre-Measure 5
distribution.
Measure 5 exerted a much larger squeeze on school revenues in the 1993-95
biennium. The 1993 legislative appropriation cut total school revenue by about 5 %
from the previous year. Faced with a substantial reduction in total funds, the
Legislature could not “equalize up" as it had in 1992-93. Thus the Legislature
generally “spread the pain equally" by freezing the effective result o f the 1992-93
constrained formula. But the Legislature did set aside S10 million to help the lowest
spending districts. Specifically, for 1993-94, the Legislature specified that each
district would take an equal per student reduction in total general operating revenue
compared to 1992-93. This general rule was subject to the following exceptions:
1. The transportation grant was fully funded at 70 % o f approved costs.
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2. $ 10 million was set aside to benefit the lowest funded districts -- those
limited by the 25 % cap in 1992-93.
3. No district was reduced more than 10 %.
4. If unanticipated property tax revenues materialized, an equivalent amount
o f state aid was removed from the 1993-94 distribution to be distributed
in 1994-95.
In 1994-95, each district received the same total amount o f general operating
revenue as 1993-94. However, unlike the 1993-94 formula, this calculation was not
made on a per student basis and the transportation grant was frozen rather than
recalculated at 70 % o f approved costs. In effect, this means that growing districts
would get no additional funds, thus reducing their per student revenue. The 1993
Legislature passed two other bills affecting the State School Fund - SB 986 and SB
880. SB 986 changed the remote school factor. The bill granted the factor in 199394 and 1994-95 to any district that received it in 1992-93. In addition, the bill gave a
special $80,000 per year grant to five small school districts. Finally, the bill sunset
the remote school factor in 1995-96 and directed the 1993-94 interim committee to
recommend a new factor.
As shown through the four transition formulas used in 1991-95, although the
new formula was made based on differences in costs that districts must bear and the
variations in resources among districts that existed prior to Measure 5, the actual
distribution o f the money does not reflect these objectives well. For example, the
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formula for the state school grant for 1993-94 used the target grant as the base
funding per student. Despite the fact that the base funding per student must be the
same in principle for all districts, the target grant was set based on the hold-harmless
level from the previous year (1992-93). Also, some factors, such as the weight for
students in poverty, in the new formula have weaknesses. These factors should be
examined and could be changed in the future. It is very difficult to attain the goal of
full equalization immediately. Thus full equalization is a long-term target.
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SPECIAL EDUCATION IN OREGON

The education o f children with handicapping conditions became a federal
priority during the 1960s and 1970s, although there were a few earlier programs. For
example, the Education o f Mentally Retarded Children Act o f 1958 provided funds
for training teachers o f handicapped children.
Title VI o f the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the
creation o f Gallaudet College by the National Technical Institute for the D eaf Act in
1965 were the beginning o f financial aid for educational programs with handicapped
children (Swanson and King 1991, 205). The 1968 Handicapped Children's Early
Education Assistance Act authorized preschool programs, and the Education o f the
Handicapped Act o f 1970 created the Bureau o f Education for the Handicapped in
the Department o f Education. Section 504 o f the Vocational Rehabilitation Act o f
1973 prohibited discrimination against physically, mentally, or emotionally
handicapped persons in schools and other federally-assisted programs (Ibid., 206).
Although most states have supported special education programs for physically or
mentally handicapped students at some level for years, many handicapped students
were being prohibited from attending local public schools until the early 1970s.
W hether due to very costly services or because o f blatant discrimination against
handicapped individuals, these exclusions were challenged under equal protection
litigation. Initiated by the Pennsylvania Association o f Retarded Children (PARC ) v.
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Pennsylvania case in 1972, some other court cases held that district actions
prohibiting handicapped students from attending local public schools violated the
equal protection clause o f the U.S. Constitution (Odden and Picus 1992, 215-219).
The national commitment to develop programs for handicapped children
expanded with enactment o f the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
P.L. 94-142. The passage o f the federal Education for All Handicapped Children Act
essentially made access to a free public education program a legal right o f all
children. States and school districts receive financial assistance to diagnose
children’s needs and to provide free, appropriate education in the least restrictive
environment. P.L. 94-142 authorized the federal government to fund up to 40
percent o f nationwide costs for special education services. Since the passage o f the
Act in 1975, Congress has consistently expanded federal legislative mandates
safeguarding the educational rights o f children with disabilities. The reauthorization
o f the act in 1986, often referred to as P.L. 99-457, provided funds for demonstration
projects for the severely disabled, research and technology, early childhood
education, and early intervention services for handicapped children from birth to age
two (Ibid., 206). After the enactment o f the early childhood amendments in 1986
(P.L. 99-457), the original name of P.L. 94-142 was changed from the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) in 1990. By adding several new provisions, the 1986 and 1990 amendments
to P.L. 94-142 broadened the scope o f the law (Ibid.. 206-207). In more detail, it
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created more definitive categories for those children whose lives are affected by
autism or traumatic brain injury, it enumerated the transitional services essential for
shaping the future lives of children with disabilities, and it provided incentives for
states to initiate early intervention programs. The number o f children served in
federally supported programs for the disabled has increased from 3,692,000 in 1977
to 5,373,000 in 1995 (Parrish 1996, 451).
Despite its success in expanding educational opportunities, the original
funding goal o f the P.L.-142, which would have financed 40 percent o f program
costs, has not been attained. Currently, the best available estimate is that only about
7 to 8 percent o f special education funding comes from federal sources. Currently,
the federal allocation under the IDEA is divided by the number o f students identified
for special education services across the nation. This results in a single average
national allocation per identified student. The amount that an individual state
receives is determined by simply multiplying the number o f special education
students identified in the state by the per student allocation for that year up to a
federal funding limit o f 12 percent o f a state’s student population (Ibid., 454). For
example, Oregon school districts received $15,628,500 from the federal government
based on the Special Education Child Count o f 52,095 and $300 per-student aid
($300 x 52,095) in 1995. The burden for meeting expanding service costs rest
largely upon state and local governments.
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Children with disabilities in Oregon have been assured a free appropriate
public education since Congress passed the Education for the Handicapped Act
(EHA) in 1975 (State Board o f Education, Oregon Department o f Education 1994,
4). Special education in Oregon preceded this federal legislation. Over the last two
decades, schools and school districts in Oregon have taken increasing responsibility
for all o f the students residing within their boundaries. On December 1, 1993,
Oregon counted over 58,758 children with disabilities from birth to 21 years o f age
who received special education (Ibid., 3). Most o f these children (96.5%) attended
pubic schools in Oregon.22 Nationally, 71 percent o f students with disabilities
attended a regular classroom more than half the day (State Superintendent o f Public
Instruction, Oregon Department o f Education 1995, 29). Students who did not attend
district programs were enrolled in Oregon’s state-operated and state-supported
schools, in early intervention programs for infants and toddlers, or in hospital
programs (State Board o f Education, Oregon Department o f Education 1994, 3).
Approximately 80 percent o f the handicapped students attending public schools have
mild speech, language, or learning disabilities. They are expected to meet the same
educational outcomes as their fellow students without disabilities, when provided
with special education and related services. Students who did not attend district
programs were enrolled in Oregon’s state and state-supported schools (Ibid., 3).

22According to “Special Education Child Count (Oregon Department o f Education.
Office o f Special Education. November 1995)." the total number o f handicapped
students attending public schools are 54.937.
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Most students with disabilities are provided with special education services
within their local education agency. The purpose o f these programs is to ensure that
students benefit from an appropriate education provided in the least restrictive
environment. Student eligibility, services and district responsibilities are governed
by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Chapter 1 o f the ESEA,
U.S. Office o f Special Education Programs, ORS Chapter 343 and Oregon
Administrative Rules (State Board o f Education, Oregon Department o f Education
1994,41).
School district programs are organized and operated by the school district
administration and the local board o f education. In addition to the technical
assistance described above, federal and state law requires that the Department o f
Education assumes responsibility for oversight o f the local education agencies’
programs. The Department conducts a comprehensive review to monitor the
implementation o f local programs and to ensure compliance with federal and state
administrative rules and policies (Ibid., 41).
The Department accomplishes this review in two steps. First, each district
submits a comprehensive plan for special education to the Department when it
applies for federal funds. These plans are audited for compliance with federal and
state law. Monitoring teams also conduct an on-site visit to determine whether the
district is appropriately implementing its special education plan. The Department
also conducts a statewide census of students on December 1 that is used for
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providing districts with federal and state funding for students with disabilities.
During the 1990 Legislative session, a simplified state special education funding
formula was adopted with passage o f SB 814. This approach replaced a complicated
application process with a formula that employs weighting o f the district’s basic
school support. It changed special education financing from the excess cost
reimbursement method to the pupil-weights method beginning FY 1991-92.
The “pupil-weights” method is one o f four basic methods all states in the
United States are using as a funding formula as mentioned earlier. The weighting
method for disabled children was developed by Richard Rossmiller in 1971
(Rossmiller 1971). Rossmiller examined comprehensive best practice special
education programs at several cities in the United States.23 From this research, cost
differentials by special education program area were fashioned that could be used to
distribute state funds (Alexander and Salmon 1995, 218). Following Rossmiller,
other researchers established other program and cost categories. In these reports,
weights were established that ranged from learning disabilities o f minimal excess
costs to very high-cost programs for disabling conditions o f multi-handicapped and
the blind (2.3 through 15.0) (Ibid., 219). Under this formula, each student who is
included in the special education child count generates more weight for the basic

23Rossmiller. Richard. “Resource Configurations and Costs in Educational
Programs for Exceptional Children,” in Jones, R. L., Kem Alexander, and K. Forbis
Jordan (eds.). Planning to Finance Education (Gainesville: National Educational
Finance Project, 1971).
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school support amount. The state formula in Oregon sets a ceiling for students with
disabilities at 11 percent o f the district’s average daily membership so that districts
which have disabled students more than 11 percent o f their average daily
membership cannot receive more state aid unless they get approval o f the
Department o f Education.
Except school based-programs, there are seven programs which are operated
or supported by the state for the disabled students who did not attend district
programs: hospital programs, regional programs, private agency education programs,
education evaluation centers, early intervention and early childhood special
education programs, the Oregon School for the Blind (OSB), and the Oregon School
for the D eaf (OSD) (State Board o f Education, Oregon Department o f Education
1994, 4-5).
Hospital programs provide instruction to students while they are hospitalized.
Students served in hospitals are patients in the state-operated hospitals (Oregon State
Hospital, Dammasch Hospital, Oregon Health Sciences University Hospital and
Fairview Training Center) and private hospitals (Emanual Hospital of Portland and
Shriners Hospital), which meet the criteria established by ORS 343.261 (Ibid., 53).
Funding for the hospital programs comes from the combination o f state general
funds, federal funds, and county school fund billings.
Regional services, in cooperation with local school districts, families and
community agencies, provide specialized educational support for children with

44

hearing impairments, vision impairments, autism, severe orthopedic impairments and
severe health impairment (Ibid., 55). The goal is to help these children benefit from
early intervention and educational opportunities provided in their communities. The
Oregon Legislature has recognized the system since 1951, when the first program
was funded followed by funding additional programs in 1983 and adopting a plan
that created a consistent level o f service and equitable funding throughout the state.
ORS 343.236 is the statutory authority for regional services and standards for
operation of regional programs are in OAR 581-15-291 through 296 (Ibid., 55).
Funding for the regional programs comes from a combination o f state general funds
and federal categorical grants. There are 4,355 students who are attending six
regional programs : Eastern, Central, Southern, Cascade, Mid-Oregon, and
Columbia. Tables 4 and 5 show the geographical distribution o f the regional
programs and their student number by program (Ibid., 56-57).
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TABLE 424
Regional Counties and Contractors

Region

Counties

Contractors

Eastern

Baker, Union, Grant, W allowa, Umatilla, Morrow,

Union ESD

Malheur

Central

Deschutes, Harney, Jefferson, Sherman, Crook,

Bend SD

Wheeler, Gilliam

Southern

Josephine. Lake, Klamath, Curry, Jackson,

Jackson ESD

Douglas

Cascade

Coos, Lincoln. Linn, Benton, Lane

Linn-Benton ESD

Mid-Ore

Marion, Polk, Yamhill, Tillamook

Marion ESD

Colum bia

Clatsop, Columbia, Washington, Hood River,

Portland School District

Clackamas, Wasco, Multnomah

24Source: 1994 Status Report on Special Education and Student Services (Oregon
Department o f Education. 1994). p.56.
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TABLE 52S
Number o f Students Receiving Services
by Regional Programs, 1990-91

R egion

H earing

V ision

O rth Imp

A utism

T otal

%

Eastern

97

52

61

65

275

6.3%

C en tral

59

42

60

55

216

5.0%

S ou th ern

132

118

138

101

489

11.2%

C ascad e

203

140

203

266

812

18.6%

M id-O regon

209

96

121

182

608

14.0%

C olu m b ia

559

418

535

443

1,955

44.9%

TOTAL

1,259

866

1,118

1,112

4,355

100.0%

P ercent

29%

20%

26%

25%

25Source: 1994 Status Report on Special Education and Student Services (Oregon
Department of Education, 1994), p.57.
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Private agency education programs are authorized by ORS 343.961 and
operate under rules adopted by the Oregon State Board o f Education (OAR 581-15044). Under these regulations, the local school district in which the treatment agency
is located is responsible for providing the education and special education services to
children enrolled in the treatment program. The Department o f Education is
responsible for the payment o f the cost o f the educational services through contracts
with the responsible local school district. There are currently 35 o f these programs
located in 20 school districts. Those sites serve over 825 children and youth on a
daily basis and as many as 1400 during a year. Contracting school districts are
funded by the Department using a formula that reflects the local districts’ per pupil
costs, a service level factor and the treatment capacity (Ibid., 59-62).
The Education Evaluation Center (EEC) is housed at Teaching Research on
the campus o f Western Oregon State College. The primary objective o f the EEC is
providing evaluation and training services to students with disabilities to serve them
in the transition from school to work. It was originally funded entirely with state
general fund money, but increasingly over the years the program has been funded
with federal funds. The mission o f the EEC is threefold: to provide evaluation
services, to provide training, and to serve youth transitioning from school to work
(Ibid., 62-67).
Early intervention and early childhood special education services are
designed to assist children with disabilities and their families. The Department
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entered into contracts with seven school districts and Education Service Districts
around the state to operate the early intervention and early childhood special
education programs beginning July 1, 1992. The contractors selected subcontractors
for each county to provide the direct services. These programs are funded by the
Department o f Education with a combination o f federal and state general funds. The
money is disbursed through contractors to seven regional contractors who, in turn,
subcontract with various agencies across the state (Ibid., 67-69).
The Oregon School for the Blind (OSB), established by the legislature in
1873, serves students with visual impairments who have educational needs beyond
those which the local school district and regional program can provide. The location
o f the services will vary based on the need o f the student, the local program and the
regional program. The school receives funding from the state general fund, federal
funds, and other funds on a biennial basis (Ibid., 76-79).
The Oregon School for the Deaf (OSD) is a residential day program for
students who are hearing impaired. The school receives funding from the state
general fund, federal funds and other funds like the Oregon School for the Blind
(OSB). Approximately 40-45 students are day students bussed to and from school
each day (Ibid., 79-82).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

MODEL AND VARIABLES

Model
The production function approach hypothesizes a well-defined relationship
between various inputs, both purchased and others, and various measures o f output,
i.e. students’ achievement. If this is correct, then serving students who are more
costly to educate, such as handicapped students, should either raise cost or lower
measures of achievement. A cost function , which is derived from a production
function, is a good approach to test whether this can serve as the empirical basis for
state aid adjustments related to the cost o f serving different types o f students. By
controlling school output and inputs, we can investigate a relationship between the
type o f students served, for example, the percent o f handicapped students, and
schooling cost.
The correlations between expenditure per student, and between the
percentage o f handicapped students, and various measures o f educational outcome
among 167 school districts which have K-12 grades are shown in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
Correlation Coefficients for Test Scores, Expenditures, and Percent o f
Handicapped Students, 1993-94
(P-values in parentheses)

Expenditure per student

Percent o f handicapped student

I.COO

0.0469
(0.555)

Test score o f grade 3 students

0.0296
(0.711)

- 0.0380
(0.633)

Test score o f grade 5 students

0.1408
(0.077)

- 0.2427
(0.002)

Test score o f grade 8 students

0.0361
(0.652)

- 0.2932
(0.000)

Test score o f grade 11 students

-0 .1 0 5 5
(0.193)

-0 .2 4 1 9
(0.002)

Average test score o f all 4 grades

0.0321
(0.692)

- 0.2875
(0.000)

Expenditure per student
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There are negative correlations between the percentage o f handicapped
students and five measures o f educational output (test scores).26 They are all
statistically significant except the correlation between the scores of third grade
students and expenditure per student. This shows that, in general, an increase in the
percentage o f handicapped students results in a drop in measures of educational
output as expected. There is a positive correlation between per student expenditure
and the percentage o f handicapped students, but it is not statistically significant. In
this simple correlation table, we do not know whether and how much a higher
fraction o f handicapped students causes an increase in per student expenditure to
achieve a given educational output (test score), because many control factors may
affect this relationship. To investigate this relationship carefully, a cost function
method can be used.
To estimate cost differentials for education o f handicapped students among
local school districts, a cost function method will be used. The general mathematical
expression for a cost function is given as

(1)

C = f (Y. P)

26Test scores of grade 3, 5. 8. 11. and average score of those four described as the
scale scores, are used as the measures o f educational outcome (There is more in
detailed explanation about the measure of educational outcome in the later section).
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where C is schooling cost, Y is a vector o f schooling outputs, and P is a vector o f
input prices. In equation (1) total cost, C, increases as output, Y, or prices, P,
increase. The educational cost function can be improved by the addition o f D, a
vector o f variables that measure attributes o f the community that influence its costs,
as in the following form

(2)

C = f (Y, P, D, e)

where, C is total cost, Y is an output aggregate, P is a vector o f input prices, D is a
vector o f variables that measure attributes o f the locality that influence its costs, and
e is an error term. D includes inputs supplied privately in the home and a variety of
other factors that affect the cost.
The cost function gives the cost o f obtaining each output vector, conditional
on input prices and community characteristics. The error term, e, includes
unobserved cost determinants and outputs as well as random variation. Identification
o f an error term is very important in an education cost function. It may include
cohort characteristics and current and past values o f unmeasured public and private
inputs. Unlike the case o f private firms, it is difficult to identify inputs and there is
not a well-defined output for public education. There does not exist a consensus on
the types of inputs to include in a cost function for education. Unobserved inputs
must be considered as included in the error term, e. The omission of outputs also can
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be included in the error term. The other important reason for the error term is that
the assumption o f cost minimization may not be appropriate in the case o f education.
Decision makers in the public education arena are not likely to seek monetary cost
minimization. Given data on outputs, input prices, and community characteristics,
the cost function can be estimated directly. Although the basic idea o f a cost
function is simple, the application o f the cost function into practice is not. This is
because many factors affect schooling costs and it is difficult to measure all school
outputs.
A change o f some characteristic such as the educational attainment o f parents
may raise or lower schooling costs through the change o f students’ achievement. If.
however, expenditure is not changed, then outputs should vary. Hence, a cost
function shows the impact o f changing any one variable while holding others
constant.
Downes and Pogue (1994) estimate the cost differentials o f educating
disadvantaged students in Arizona school districts by using a cost function method.
A true cost function is one that takes into account the quality of output as well as the
quantity. Thus, it is necessary to correctly measure school output, though it is very
difficult to measure it perfectly, to estimate cost function parameters. According to
Downes and Pogue, when unobserved determinants o f costs are stable across time
and are unrelated to observed variables, parameters estimated by ordinary least
squares from cross-section data for a single year are unbiased and consistent (Ibid..
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90). However, if unobserved determinants o f costs are correlated with observed
variables (regressors), estimated parameters from cross-section data for a single year
are biased and inconsistent.
In terms o f school outputs, both determination and measurement issues must
be considered in estimating a cost function for education. Hanushek (1979), after a
review o f 114 studies on public education, finds that only a small proportion find any
significant relationship between school resources and student performance while a
large proportion o f these studies find significant relationships between
socioeconomic characteristics o f communities and educational outputs. If student
background and socioeconomic characteristics o f communities are important
determinants o f student performance, then communities with large amounts o f
characteristics that enhance (decrease) educational outputs will spend less (more) on
school resources to obtain the same level and quality o f educational attainment than
communities without such characteristics. Several variables can be used to represent
the socioeconomic characteristics o f a community.
Even if we know what determines school outputs, it is difficult to measure
school outputs precisely. Basically, there are two commonly used measures of
educational outputs: educational achievement o f students while they are in school
and student performance in the labor market. It is easier to measure educational
achievement o f students while they are in school than student performance in the
labor market. But the use of only one type o f measurement cannot completely

55

control for all dimensions o f school outputs. Moreover, the measurement o f
educational achievement o f students while they are in school is not an easy task. For
example, the use o f cognitive test scores, the most widely used method, is not a
perfect measurement o f students’ achievement.
I use a cost function method to estimate the additional costs o f special
education for handicapped students in Oregon school districts. Although my study is
similar to the study done by Downes and Pogue in terms o f the use o f a cost function
method, there are two differences between their study and my study. First, they did
not use control variables to serve as proxies for the effect o f household
characteristics on the cost o f achieving gains in school output. This is especially
important for school output, because school output is influenced by various
socioeconomic factors o f a student. The inclusion o f various control variables for
school output as well as other independent variables can generate more precise and
accurate cost function estimates than without them. Also Downes and Pogue do not
consider handicapped students in the controls for district and student characteristics.
Because the cost o f educating handicapped students is much greater than the cost of
educating regular students, and the fraction o f handicapped students are different
among school districts, the fraction o f handicapped students must be included in the
cost function.
The second difference is that my study uses a different dependent variable in
the regression model, which is very important in estimating economies of scale.
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Downes and Pogue’s study uses expenditure per student as a dependent variable and
average daily membership (ADM) as one o f the independent variables in the
regression model to test whether economies o f scale exists between expenditure per
student and enrollment. However, the use o f the same variable (average daily
membership) in both the dependent and independent variables can create biased
estimates. Downes and Pogue’s study, as well as most other studies dealing with the
issue o f economies o f scale, uses expenditure per student as a dependent variable and
average daily membership or enrollment as an independent variable. Thus, if the
statistical result shows that the expenditure per student decreases when enrollment
increases, it is treated as proof o f economies o f scale.
In a recent article, Brindle argues that there are risks of spurious correlations
in any case where the variables are not independent (Brindle 1994). In other words,
if the dependent (independent) variable is generated based on the independent
(dependent) variable, the correlation between the two variables in the statistical
model is not reliable. Brindle said, “A simple rule is that attempts to determine a
correlation between two compound variables, each o f which contains a common
variable, will necessarily be risky.” (Ibid., 120) Brindle illustrates this using an
example based on random numbers. He picked three groups of random numbers, A.
B, C, not statistically related to each other. Then, he created two more groups using
A, B. and C. C/B and A/C (Table 7).
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TABLE I 21
Random Values o f Three Variables
and Six Compound Variables Calculated from Them

A

B

C

A/B

A/C

C /B

B/A

C/A

B/C

53

99

50

0.54

1.06

0.51

1.87

0.94

1.98

59

98

84

0.60

0.70

0.86

1.66

1.42

1.17

66

47

1

1.40

66.00

0.02

0.71

0.02

47.0

7

15

78

0.47

0.09

5.20

2.14

11.14

0.19

71

66

86

1.08

0.83

1.30

0.93

1.21

0.77

34

63

6

0.54

5.67

0.10

1.85

0.18

10.50

75

74

11

1.01

6.82

0.15

0.99

0.15

6.73

78

96

95

0.81

0.82

0.99

1.23

1.22

1.01

74

52

94

1.42

0.79

1.81

0.70

1.27

0.55

24

15

9

1.60

2.67

0.60

0.63

0.38

1.67

93

92

5

1.01

18.6

0.05

0.99

0.05

18.40

79

36

45

2.19

1.76

1.25

0.46

0.57

0.80

51

16

55

3.19

0.93

3.44

0.31

1.08

0.29
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49

16

1.18

3.63

0.33

0.84

0.28

3.06

69

7

41

9.86

1.68

5.86

0.10

0.59

0.17

14

22

44

0.64

0.32

2.00

1.57

3.14

0.50

69

31

73

2.23

0.95

2.35

0.45

1.06

0.42

53

1

65

53.00

0.82

65.0

0.02

1.23

0.02

71

76

89

0.

0.80

1 .17

1.07

1.25

0.85

64

18

98

3.56

0.65

5.44

0.28

1.53

0.18

27Brindle, Ray. “Lies, Damned Lies and “Automobile Dependence : Some
Hyperbolic Reflections.” Australasian Transport Research Forum (vol. 19. 1994).
Transport Research Centre. University of Melbourne, p. 123. This table is based on
the table o f Brindle’s paper.
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These two variables, C/B and A/C, are statistically related to each other according to
the following power regression model (Ibid., 121-123).

(3)

C ! B = 1.5261 - ( A /C )-0" 92

In equation (3), the R square value is 0.62 and t-value is -5.469. (Table 8).

TABLE 8
Power Regression Model between C/B and A/C
Dependent V ariab le: C/B

Variable
A/C

Regression Coefficient

t-value

-0 .9 9 9 1 6 7

- 5.469*

Constant

1.526110

R-square

0.62431

Adjusted R-square

0.60343

F
Number o f observation = 20

* P < 0.000

29.91131*
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The power regression model, using two variables (A/C and C), can be used to test
whether the method Downes and Pogue used is reliable or not.

(4)

A l C = 54.3527 (C )‘10199

In equation (4), the R square is 0.80 and t-value is -8.532. (Table 9).

TABLE 9
Power Regression Model between A/C and C
Dependent variable : A/C

Regression Coefficient

t-value

C

- 1.019861

- 8.532*

Constant

54.352684

R-square

0.80174

Adjusted R-square

0.79072

Variable

F
Number o f observation = 20

* P < 0.000

72.78825*
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Despite no relation between A and C, there exists a relation between A/C and
C. This is because both independent and dependent variables contain the same
variable, C. By the same token, if we regard A as total expenditure and C as average
daily membership, A/C will be expenditure per student. Regardless o f the previous
relationship, there necessarily will exist some relationship between expenditure per
student (A/C) and average daily membership (C) as shown above. Therefore, the use
o f average daily membership as the denominator in the dependent variable and o f the
same variable as an independent variable is not a good method. Downes and Pogue
necessarily created a negative covariance with the variable itself, because they used
average daily membership in the denominator o f the dependent variable. Therefore,
the negative regression coefficient o f average daily membership (ADM) and its
statistical significance in the regression model is not reliable. To avoid the use o f
average daily membership in the dependent variable, total expenditure instead o f
expenditure per student will be used as a dependent variable in this study.
The mathematical relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable may take many plausible forms, each with its particular
properties. There are no clear rules for choosing the best functional form,

28

although

parsimony or simplicity is one criterion. Two o f the simplest functional forms are
the purely linear and the purely multiplicative model. Each o f these functional forms
"*8
‘ This section is based on The Political Economy o f Urban Schools (Kartzman,
Martin T., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 194-203) and Economic
Statistics and Econometrics (Mirer. Thad W.. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company. 1988, p. 106-112).
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has its relative advantage. The multiplicative model, the well-known Cobb-Douglas
function, can be transformed into a log-log form between inputs and outputs. This
model is estimated by taking the natural logarithm o f all variables (except the
constant term). There is an important difference in interpreting this model in
comparison with non-log and semi-log models.29 When we interpret the relationship
between an independent variable and the dependent variable in the log-log model (for
example, interpretation o f (3i in In Y = Po + Pi In X). a one-percent change in X leads
to a Pi percent change in the predicted value o f the dependent variable, Y. Thus, it
3Y JC
can be described as Pi = ----------. In the log-log model, thus, Pi can be directly
dX Y

interpreted as the elasticity of Y with respect to X.30 In the semi-log model (In Y =
Po + Pi X), a one-unit change in X leads to a Pi percent change in Y.
The Cobb-Douglas cost functions will be used in this study to estimate
parameters. Although linear models have the advantage o f computational simplicity
and comprehensibility, the Cobb-Douglas form can explain the major task o f this
study (i. e. economies o f scale) better than the linear form. Also, I do not expect that
any independent variable takes a zero value in this study, which makes the value o f

29The semi-log model means that only the dependent variable has a log form.
^In economics, this elasticity is equal to the percentage change in Y divided by the
percentage change in X resulting from a movement along the relation between Y and
X.
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the output zero, regardless o f the value o f all other independent v ariab les/1
Moreover, some studies indicated that the logarithmic specification o f the cost
function (the Cobb-Douglas or translog) tended to fit the cost data slightly better
(Butler and Monk 1985).
If schools attempt to minimize their costs, a cost function can be described as
a function o f total output and the prices o f inputs. Upon taking the natural
logarithms (In) on the cost function, the specific form o f the cost function

(5)

InC = ao + I p, Y; + lyylnP y + I 5* In D* + e

where the Y< are elements o f the output vector, Py are input prices, D* are controls for
district and student characteristics, and s is a zero-mean error term.
Total expenditure instead o f expenditure per student will be used as a
dependent variable in the regression model, because the use o f average daily
membership in both dependent and independent variables causes measurement error
in the regression model.

(6)

In TC = ao + I P/ Yi + S yy In Py + X 5* In D* + z

3'Since the logarithm of zero is undefined, one must either eliminate observations
with this magnitude or assume that the magnitude is truly some small positive
number, such as, 0.1. This is a major disadvantage o f multiplicative models.
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where TC is total expenditure.

Variables
Total expenditure used in this study includes expenditure for the regular
education program and all other expenditures for compensatory and special
education.32 But transportation costs are excluded because they are not related to
school output — students’ test scores.
It is very important to select appropriate variable(s) to measure school outputs
in a cost function, although it is almost impossible. There are some proxies to
measure school output. Test scores are the most frequently used measure among
them. The multiple choice national Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) measures verbal
and mathematical skills. Test scores, reported on a scale o f 200 to 800, are often
required for college admission. These scores are often used as a measure of
educational output. According to the College Board, scores usually drop when a
higher percentage o f students participate. In Oregon, the average percentage o f high
school students taking the SAT has climbed steadily, but it still stays around 50
percent and it varies by school district.33 The SAT score provides a consistent basis
to compare educational achievement in the nation. However, it is not a good
measure o f educational output in the state, because, in general, it is taken only by

32Thus, the expenditure for students in poverty is included in the total expenditure.
33In 1982. only 42 percent o f Oregon's high school graduates took the SAT. In
1995, 51 percent took the test.
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college-bound students. Within the state, a better measure is available because all
students are required to take the same tests. Thus, I use the Oregon Statewide
Assessment test scores instead o f the SAT scores.
The Oregon Statewide Assessment Program annually tests all students in
grades 3, 5, 8, and 11 in the subject areas o f reading and mathematics. Two types o f
assessment data are reported to the state government; (1) The percentage o f students
scoring at defined performance levels: basic, proficient, and advanced, and (2) The
overall achievement estimate, or scale score, that is comparable from grade to grade
within a subject.
—Students at the basic level are not making satisfactory progress and are functioning
below grade level expectations. They are able to answer correctly less than 80
percent o f relatively easy questions.
—Students at the proficient level are making satisfactory progress and are well
prepared for the next level o f schooling. They are able to answer correctly about 80
percent o f average difficulty questions.
—Students at the advanced level demonstrate superior performance. They are
functioning above grade level expectations and are able to answer correctly more
than 80 percent o f the most difficult questions.
The scale score is reported on a developmental scale ranging from about 150
to 270, which allows the measurement o f student growth from year to year within a
subject area. It is an equal-interval scale representing achievement of reading or
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math skills o f grade 3-12. The scale was originally (1976) centered at 200 for the
average 5th grade score to distinguish it from other commonly used scales, such as
the SAT. The score o f Oregon’s Statewide Assessment Test is a much better
measure for school output in this study because its coverage is much higher than the
SAT and all students who are receiving special education and ESL classes are
required to take it.34
I investigated the relationship among eight test scores which represent
educational outputs. They are the percentage o f students scoring “proficient” or
“advanced” levels on the reading and mathematics tests and scale scores o f grade 3,
5, 8, and 11 students. According to correlation tests among these eight variables, all
variables are correlated with each other (Table 10).

34For more detailed description about the Oregon Statewide Assessment Program,
see Appendix.
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TABLE 10
Correlation Coefficients for Test Programs Scores
(P-value is parentheses)

PA.G3

PA.G5

PA.G8

P A .G ll

SS.G3

SS.G5

SS.G8

PA.G3

1.000

PA.G5

0.2874
(0.000)

1.000

PA.G8

0.1840
(0.019)

0.3413
(0.000)

1.000

P A .G ll

0.1901
(0.016)

0.3518
(0.000)

0.2547
(0.001)

1.000

SS.G3

0.6323
(0.000)

0.4101
(0.000)

0.3006
(0.000)

0.2775
(0.000)

1.000

SS.G5

0.2543
(0.001)

0.8563
(0.000)

0.3783
(0.000)

0.2578
(0.001)

0.4882
(0.000)

1.000

SS.G8

0.2340
(0.003)

0.3067
(0.000)

0.8117
(0.000)

0.3549
(0.000)

0.3733
(0.000)

0.4028
(0.000)

1.000

SS.G11

0.1805
(0.024)

0.3315
(0.000)

0.2224
(0.005)

0.8803
(0.000)

0.2563
(0.001)

0.3305
(0.000)

0.3546
(0.000)

SS.G11

1.000

PA means the percentage o f students scoring “proficient” or “advanced” level on
tests.
SS means scale score o f tests and G means grade.
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Because all scale scores are correlated closely with the percentages o f
students scoring “proficient” or “advanced” levels on the reading and mathematics
tests, only scale scores will be used as the variables for educational output. The use
o f multiple scores results in a multicollinearity problem in the regression model.
Also, the use o f scale scores instead o f the percentage o f students scoring
“proficient” or “advanced” levels on the reading and mathematics tests is better in
the interpretation o f the regression model. Thus, output aggregate (Y) includes the
average scale scores o f current grade 3, grade 5, grade 8, and 11 test scores.35
It is generally known that socioeconomic factors are important to school
output. Two important socioeconomic factors related to school output are parents'
income and parents’ education level. It is generally recognized that wealthy parents
can and do provide additional material and tutoring for their children at home. These
children can, therefore, be educated to a given level with fewer school resources.
Income data for students is not available. However, the median household income in
the district would reflect family income o f students. Thus, the median household
income will be used as a control variable to reflect variation in family inputs.
The educational level o f parents affects a student’s academic performance.
Educated parents are more likely to help their children with homework, provide extra

35Generally, sixth grade scores are a relevant measure o f the final output o f the
elementary school, eighth grade scores are a relevant measure of the output o f middle
school, and twelfth grade scores are a relevant measure o f the final output o f high
school.
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reading material, and in general, complement the work o f teachers, than uneducated
parents. Data directly related to the students is not available. I use educational
attainment o f the adult population, measured as the percentage o f the adult
population with the equivalent o f a high school education or more, as the second
measure o f socioeconomic characteristics. I use the percentage o f high school
graduates in the study, because it is the most widely used variable to measure
education level.
Input prices (P) include average teacher salary and average administrator
salary. Average administrator salaries, however, will be excluded in this study,
because the data for average administrator salaries is not available. Since the teacher
salary is not determined exogenously in a competitive market, the relation between
teacher salary and cost is problematic. Higher salaries increase cost, but some
studies indicate that school districts with more resources also pay higher teacher
salaries. For policy purpose, it is important to know the average salaries teachers
would have to be paid, rather than the actual salary. Therefore, some control
variables are needed for average teacher salary.
It is not clear what variables should be included as control variables for input
prices in terms o f teacher salaries. It has been generally recognized that cost of
living, revenue-generating potential, supply and demand for teachers, local industry
wages and salaries, and salaries o f neighboring districts are factors that affect teacher
salaries. While each o f these is emphasized in competing models, no one model has
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been found to satisfactorily explain variations in teacher salaries within and across
geographical regions.
Chambers (1980) investigates the relationship between teachers’ salaries and
cost o f living in California school districts and found that the cost o f living affected
the amount o f money offered to teachers.36 Matthews (1980) analyzes data from
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s) across the United States to
determine if changes in the Consumer Price Indices were predictive o f changes in
teachers’ salaries. He found that changes in Consumer Price Indices were not related
to changes in teachers’ salaries.37 Matthews and Holms (1988) tested the
relationship between teachers’ salaries and the salaries o f contiguous districts. They
found that the salaries paid in all contiguous districts did not impact equally on
teachers’ salaries within an individual district. They concluded that identification of
the causes o f differences in teachers’ salaries was complex and required more than
statistical analysis o f finance data (Matthews and Holms 1988, 258). Recently.
Matthews et al. (1993) argued that the salaries in neighboring districts and local
revenue generating potential have a strong influence on teachers’ salaries in local
districts.

36Chambers, Jay G. “The Development o f a Cost o f Education Index: Some
Empirical Estimates and Policy Issues,” Journal o f Education Finance (vol. 5.
1980), p.262-281.
37Matthews examined the relationship between the consumer price index (CPI) and
teacher salaries using a 10-year period (1969-1979). He found that changes in cost
o f living (CPI) were not consistently related to changes in teacher salaries.
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Before Measure 5, school districts in Oregon got much o f their money from
property taxes. Property tax-rich districts fared well and so did the teachers’ salaries.
But, in 1990, Measure 5 limited property taxes and gave control o f school funding to
the state. Therefore, it is expected that local property value will not impact teachers'
salaries as significantly as before. On the other hand, teacher salaries do not change
dramatically from year to year, so the impact o f Measure 5 should not be great in this
study which uses 1993-94 data. Whether or not local property value should be
included as a control variable for teacher salary is based on some statistical tests as
described later. One additional issue is a local tax for education. If voters pass a
local option initiative, allowing a local tax for education in the future, it will be a
factor affecting teachers’ salaries.
Generally, five factors, cost o f living, districts’ revenue potential, and
teachers’ salaries o f neighboring districts affect teacher salaries in addition to
teachers’ experience and teachers’ education level. I investigated what factors
explain the variation in teacher salary using Oregon school district data. It is
generally known that a teacher’s salary is decided by a teacher’s education and
experience. The test shows that there is a strong relationship between a teacher's
salary and teacher’s education and experience (Table 11).
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TABLE 11
Correlation Coefficients for Teacher Salary, Experience, Education, Teacher
Salaries of Contiguous Districts, Income, and Property Value
(P-value in parentheses)

Teacher
salary

Teacher
salary

Teacher
experience

Teacher
education
level

median
household
income

Total
taxable
property
value
per
student

Median
housing
value

Average
teacher
salary o f
neighboring
districts

1.000

1.000

Teacher
experience

0.7584
(0.000)

Teacher
education
level

0.6381
(0.000)

(0.000)

M edian
household
incom e

0.4436
(0.000)

0.2984

0.4787

(0.000)

(0.000)

Total taxable
property
value per
student

0.2364
(0.005)

0.0520
(0.516)

0.1576
(0 0480

M edian
housing
value

0.6307
(0.000)

0.3799

0.5121

0.6709

0.4043

(0.000)

( 0 .000 )

(0.000)

( 0 . 000 )

Average
teacher
salary o f
neighboring
district

0.5686
(0.000)

0.3174

0.4995

0.3564

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0 .1330
(0.096)

0.4567

1.000

1.000

0.1405
(0.078)

1.000

1.000

0.5268
(0.000)

1.000
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In terms o f a teacher’s education, the correlation coefficient is 0.6381 and in
terms o f a teacher’s experience it is 0.7584. I also tested whether the district’s
revenue potential and neighboring districts’ teachers’ salaries affect teacher salary.
Although cost o f living may be an important variable to determine teachers’ salaries,
I cannot find a good proxy for the cost-of-living difference among school districts.
M edian household income or median housing value can be a plausible proxy.
However, the use o f median household income or o f median housing value as a
proxy for cost-of-living is problematic for some reasons. While it can be a good
proxy to measure cost-of-living differences between urban and rural districts, it
cannot be a good one to measure cost-of-living difference among urban school
districts. For example, although there are little differences in cost o f living between
the Portland school district and the Lake Oswego school district, there are large
differences in median household income and median housing value between them.38
Also median household income is used as a control variable for parental inputs. A
district’s taxable property value per student is used as a proxy variable for the
district’s revenue potential.
To generate the teacher salary o f contiguous districts, I, first o f all, calculated
the average teacher salaries o f the county where the district is located and o f three to

38According to the 1990 Census School District Data Book (U.S. Bureau o f Census.
November 1994), the median household income is $49,997 in the Lake Oswego
school district and $25,526 in the Portland school district. Also the median housing
value is $130,036 in the lake Oswego school district and $58,026 in the Portland
school district in the same year.
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five neighboring counties depending on the number o f neighboring counties.39 Next.
I calculated the teacher salary o f contiguous districts by averaging among the average
teacher salary o f three to five neighboring counties and teacher salaries o f all other
districts o f the county where the district is located. The correlation coefficient
between average teacher salary and teacher salary o f contiguous districts is 0.5686
and is statistically significant.
Finally, I estimated a regression with the variables, teacher’s experience,
teacher’s education level, average teacher salary o f neighboring districts, and taxable
property value per student, as independent variables. Table 12 shows the result of
the regression. All four variables (teacher’s experience, teacher’s education level,
average teacher salary o f neighboring districts, and taxable property value per
student) are statistically significant at a 0.05 level.

39Counties are neighbored with three to five other counties.
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TABLE 12
Estimates o f Teacher Salary Function
Dependent Variable : Average Teacher Salary

Regression Coefficients

t-value

Teacher’s experience (year)

910.147111

9.866*

Percent o f teachers w ho have master’s or Ph.D.

79.545311

4.155*

Average teacher salary o f neighboring districts

0.353870

4.248*

Taxable property value per student

0.007515

3.932*

Variables

degree

Constant

5967.263765

R-square

0.71525

Adjusted R-square

0.70681

F
Number o f observation = 140

* P < 0.05

84.77389*
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While a teacher’s experience and education level should increase output as
well as cost, average teacher salary o f neighboring districts and taxable property
value per student relate to a higher cost per unit o f input. For example, a school
district with higher property tax value per student (or higher average teacher salary of
neighboring districts) will spend more than a school district with lower property tax
value per student (or lower average teacher salary o f neighboring districts), if all
other things are held constant. Thus, average teacher salary of neighboring districts
and taxable property value per student will be used as control variables for average
teacher salary.
The other factor o f price differences among districts comes from economies
o f scale (size o f enrollment). Economies o f scale exist if an increase in enrollment
causes a decrease in cost per student, when school output (test scores) is held
constant.40 However, although enrollment or average daily membership can be used
to investigate economies o f scale, its direct use in a cost function, where expenditure
per student (total expenditure divided by average daily membership) is used as a
dependent variable, can cause statistically misleading results as mentioned earlier. In
this study, total expenditure will be used instead o f expenditure per student as a
dependent variable.41

40Because total expenditure is used as a dependent variable, economies of scale exist
if a one-percent increase o f enrollment causes a less than one-percent increase o f
total cost.
41A more detailed mathematical model will be discussed later.
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Variables for district and student characteristics will be the fraction o f a
district’s student body that are African-American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander,
Native American, limited English proficient, students taking vocational education,
poor students,42 and handicapped students.
Among 167 school districts only 89 districts report their number o f ESL
students to the Department o f Education for state aid. The remaining 78 districts
either have no ESL programs or have the programs financed by their own money.
Possible proxy variables are the number o f Hispanic students or the number of
Asian/Pacific Islander students or the number o f both students, who in general, need
ESL education. The largest users o f ESL are Hispanic and Asian/Pacific Islander
students who were not bom in America.43 To determine whether this is a good
proxy variable or not, I tested the relationship between the percentage o f ESL
students and the percentage o f Hispanic and Asian/Pacific Islander students for the
89 available school districts. The test shows that the strongest relationship is
between percent ESL students and percent Hispanic students (Table 13).44
Therefore, I use the percentage o f Hispanic students as a proxy for the percentage o f
ESL students.

42The fraction o f poor students will be described as the percentage o f students
receiving free or reduced-price lunch.
43Roughly two-third o f Oregon’s 15,700 identified national origin students are
Spanish speaking and other languages include Vietnamese. Khmer. Chinese and
Russian (Oregon Department o f Education 1994, 93).
44The Pearson's r is 0.7156 and it is statistically significant.
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TABLE 13
Correlation Coefficients for Percent of ESL Students and Percent of
Asian/Pacific Island and Hispanic Students, 1994-95
(P-values in parentheses)

Percent ESL
students

Percent ESL students

Percent
Hispanic
students

Percent
Asian/Pacific
Island students

Percent
Hispanic and
Asian/Pacific
students

0.000

Percent Hispanic
students

0.7226
(0.000)

0.000

Percent Asian/Pacific
Island students

-0.1292
(0.228)

-0.0873
(0.262)

0.000

Percent Hispanic and
A sian/Pacific Island
students

0.7156
(0.000)

0.9819
(0.000)

0.1030
(0.185)

0.000
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The fraction o f talented and gifted students will not be used in the equation
due to the absence o f the data, although it is a component o f district and student
characteristics that should affect both cost and measured outcome.
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DATA

167 Oregon school districts have all grades, K.-12. However, due to missing
data, the actual number o f school districts in the regression analysis is 128.
The major data source are School Finance and Data Information Services and
the Office o f Special Education o f the Oregon Department o f Education. The
following is a list o f the variables and the data sources used in this study (Table 14).
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TABLE 14
Variables and Data Sources

Variables
Total expenditure

Data Sources

Audited 1993-94 per Student Current Expenditures
Office o f Educational Support Services, School
Finance and Data Information Service, Oregon
Department o f Education, June 1995 p. 2-8.

Average test score o f grade
3,5, 8 and 11

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f

Median household income

1990 Census School District Data Book MESA

Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1994.45

Group on contract with the U.S. Bureau o f Census.
November 1994.46

1990 Census School District Data Book MESA

Percent o f resident
graduated high school or
higher

Group on contract with the U.S. Bureau o f Census,
November 1994.

Average daily membership

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f
Educational Support Services. School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1994.

Average teacher salary

Certificated Personnel File, Number of Certificated
Teachers with Salary by District Oregon
Department o f Education, January 1996.

Average teacher salary of
neighboring districts

Certificated Personnel File, Number o f Certificated
Teachers with Salary by District Oregon
Department o f Education, January 1996.
Oregon School Directory 1994-1995 Oregon
Department o f Education. June 1995. p. 14.

45This comes from ORPROFIL.DBF file.
4SThis comes from TOP 100.DBF file.
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Total taxable property value
per student

Oregon Property Tax Statistics: Supplement, Fiscal
Year 1993-94 Oregon Department o f Revenue,
1995.

Percent o f American Indian
students

OREDOOI9 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f
Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1994.

Percent o f Asian/Pacific
Islander students

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f

Percent o f black students

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f

Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department of
Education, June 1994.

Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1994.
Percent o f Hispanic students

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office o f
Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department of
Education, June 1994.

Percent o f handicapped
students

Special Education Child Count State Funding
Percent. Preparedfor 1993-94 School Funding
Office o f Special Education, Oregon Department o f
Education, October 1994.

Percent o f students
receiving subsidized lunch

Percent o f students
receiving vocational
education

ORED0019 1994 Oregon School Profiles Office of
Educational Support Services, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department of
Education, June 1994.

1970-1994 Demographic Data, School Finance and
Data Information Service, Oregon Department of
Education, May 1995
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In addition to these, some supplemental data was obtained from the following
sources:

•

Number of Teachers and Average Salary by District 1989-90 School Year
Oregon Department o f Education, April 1990.

•

PL 94-142 Child Count Comparisons Office of Special Education Oregon
Department o f Education, May 1991.

•

Audited 1989-90 per Student Current Expenditures Division o f Management
Services, School Finance and Data Information Services, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1991.

•

School Districts Audited Summary Division o f Management Services, School
Finance and Data Information Services, Oregon Department o f Education, June
1991.

•

Preliminary Allocation Report for Local Education Agencies 1995-1996 Office
o f Special Education, Oregon Department o f Education, May 1995.
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•

State School Fund Report of English as a Second Language Students Eligible for
Additional Weighting Office o f Compensatory Education, Oregon Department o f
Education, June 1995.

•

Oregon School Districts Audit Summary Office o f Educational Support Services,
School Finance and Data Information Service, Oregon Department o f Education.
June 1995.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

ESTIM ATES OF THE COST FUNCTION PARAMETERS

Estimates o f a cost function equation (6) are presented in Table 15. The
parameters in column two o f the table are partial regression coefficients o f the
equation and the t-values o f the regression coefficients are presented in column three.
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TABLE 15
Estimates o f Cost Function Parameters
Dependent Variable : Natural Logarithm o f Total Expenditure

Regression Coefficients

t-value

0.006012

0.911

0.100777

1.313

-0 .0 0 0 1 0 7

- 0.044

0.905911

72.649*

0.372881

2.511*

-0 .2 4 1 7 8 8

- 1.595

0.115677

3.948*

-0 .0 0 1 9 9 6

- 0 .5 3 2

Fraction black

0.022523

2.892*

Fraction Asian/Pacific Islander

0.011582

1.832

-0 .0 0 1 1 0 7

- 0.925

Fraction handicapped

0.011353

2.532*

Fraction receiving subsidized lunch

0.003360

4.304*

Fraction receiving vocational
education
Constant

0.000291

0.210

V ariab les
Average scale score o f grade 3, 5, 8,
and 11
Natural logarithm o f median
household income
Fraction o f resident graduated high
school or higher
Natural logarithm o f average daily
membership
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary o f neighboring districts
Natural logarithm o f total property
tax value per student
Fraction American Indian

Fraction Hispanic

3.743056

R-square

0.99421

Adjusted R-square

0.99350

F
Number o f observation = 128

* P < 0.05

1387.08910*
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The coefficient o f the output measure, the average scale scores o f grades 3, 5.
8, and 11, is positive (0.006012) but is not statistically significant at a 0.05 level.
This means that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between
the average scale scores o f grades 3, 5, 8, and 11 and total expenditure. It is an
unexpected result, because I assumed that the school outputs increase if educational
costs increase, if all other things are held constant. This implies that the estimates o f
the regression shown in the table do not come from a true cost function.
The regression coefficient o f the median household income is positive
(0.100777) but is not statistically significant at a 0.05 level. I expected a negative
coefficient, because wealthy parents generally provide additional materials and
tutoring for their children at home so that those children can be educated to a given
level with fewer school resources.
The education level o f parents does not affect total expenditure. The
coefficient o f percent o f residents who graduated high school or higher is negative (0.000107) and is not statistically significant at a 0.05 level.
The regression coefficients for average daily membership is 0.905911 and is
statistically significant. This means that a one-percent increase in average daily
membership causes approximately a 0.9 percent increase in total expenditure, if all
other things are held constant. Since the increase o f total expenditure is less than
proportional to the increase of enrollment, it implies economies of scale. In terms of
the regression coefficient for average daily membership, however, we must be
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careful to interpret it, because the appropriate test is that the coefficient is significant
by different from one by the standard t-test instead o f from zero. Therefore, it is not
clear whether the regression coefficient is biased in this table. One way to address
this concern is to run a regression with average daily membership as the dependent
variable and total expenditure as an independent variable, with all other variables left
the same. Table 16 shows the result o f the regression.
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TABLE 16
Estimates o f Cost Function Parameters
Dependent Variable : Natural Logarithm of Average Daily Membership

V ariab les

R egression C oefficients

t-value

- 0.007799

- 1.084

-0 .1 0 1 7 4 7

- 1.213

Average scale score o f grade 3, 5, 8,
and 1 1
Natural logarithm o f median
household income
Fraction o f resident graduated high
school or higher
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary o f neighboring districts
Natural logarithm o f total property
tax value per student
Fraction American Indian

- 0.000008

- 0.003

- 0.228464

- 1.382

0.209992

1.263

-0 .1 3 0 0 4 4

-4 .0 8 1 *

0.003193

0.780

Fraction black

-0 .0 2 1 7 0 2

-2 .5 3 1 *

Fraction Asian/Pacific Islander

-0 .0 1 0 8 8 5

- 1.570

0.001501

1.151

Fraction handicapped

-0 .0 1 2 4 4 1

- 2.541*

Fraction receiving subsidized lunch

-0 .0 0 3 7 1 1

- 4.360*

Fraction receiving vocational
education
N atural logarithm o f total
exp en d itu re
Constant

-0 .0 0 0 5 1 6

-0 .3 4 1

1.080723

72.649*

Fraction Hispanic

-4.8 9 9 4 2 1

R-square

0.99386

Adjusted R-square

0.99310

F
Number o f observation = 128

* P < 0.05

1306.83070*
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The regression coefficient o f total expenditure is 1.080723 and its standard
error is 0.014876. It is also statistically significant. Because it is greater than one by
a statistically significant amount, the regression coefficient is not biased. In other
words, the district with a larger number o f students in general spends less for one
student, if all other things are held constant. For example, the Huntington school
district had average daily membership o f 111.3 and spent $789,684 o f total
expenditure in FY 1993-94 ($7,095.09 per student). If its average daily membership
doubled (222.6), the model estimates that it must spend $1,505,067 instead of
$1,579,368 (twice $789,684). The average expenditure per student would be
$6,761.31, which is approximately a $334 decrease compared to the actual level.
Because the regression coefficient is less than one, unbiased, and statistically
significant, economies o f scale exist.47
The regression coefficient for average teacher salary is positive (0.372881)
and statistically significant in Table 15. A one-percent increase in average teacher
salary causes approximately a 0.37 percent increase in total expenditure, if all other
independent variables are held constant.
The regression coefficient o f the average teacher salary of neighboring
districts is negative (-0.241788) and is not statistically significant. This is an
unexpected result because I expected that a district neighbored with districts that

47This interpretation is totally based on the present expenditure pattern o f the school
districts rather than the true cost.
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have higher teacher salaries would tend to spend more money for teacher salaries
than a district neighbored with districts that have lower teacher salaries.
The regression coefficient o f the total taxable property value per student is
positive (0.115677) and is statistically significant. A one-percent increase in total
taxable property value per student causes approximately a 0.12 percent increase in
total expenditure, if all other things are held constant. This implies that districts with
higher property value still spend more money on education despite the effects o f
Measure 5. Also, a statistically significant coefficient implies that the money from
property taxes is not used to increase students’ test scores. This means that school
spending is not necessarily related to school outcomes in Oregon school districts,
which violates the assumption o f a cost function.
The regression coefficients o f independent variables representing a district's
student composition are all positive except the fraction o f Hispanic students and the
fraction o f American Indian students, and three o f them (fraction o f black students,
fraction o f poor students, and fraction o f handicapped students) are statistically
significant at a 0.05 level.48 This means that an increase in the fraction o f these
students will increase total expenditure, if all other things are held constant. One
thing to be careful about here is the effect o f an outlier in terms o f the percentage of
black students. Because the Portland school district has a very large percentage of

48All variables representing student composition are the percent o f such students.
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black students and spends relatively more money than the state average,491 tested
whether the Portland school district was the critical determinant of this result or not.
Table 17 shows the estimates o f the same equation but without the data for the
Portland school district.

49While state average o f the percent o f black student was 2.57 % and expenditure per
student was $4,939.67, Portland school district had 15.8 % o f black student in its
enrollment and spent $6,096.58 per student in FY 1993-94.
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TABLE 17
Estimates o f Cost Function Parameters
(Portland School District Excluded)
Dependent Variable : Natural Logarithm o f Total Expenditure

Variables

Regression Coefficients

t-value

0.005755

0.865

0.100818

1.309

- 0.000059

- 0.024

0.905595

72.205*

0.378348

2.527*

- 0.237430

- 1.556

0.117419

3.949*

- 0.001853

- 0.489

Fraction black

0.015721

0.831

Fraction A sian/Pacific Islander

0.012475

1.852

-0 .0 0 1 0 5 1

- 0.868

Fraction handicapped

0.011408

2.534*

Fraction receiving subsidized lunch

0.003296

4.120*

Fraction receiving vocational
education
Constant

0.000334

0.239

R-square

0.99378

Adjusted R-square

0.99300

Average scale score o f grade 3, 5, 8,
and 11
Natural logarithm o f median
household income
Fraction o f resident graduated high
school or higher
Natural logarithm o f average daily
membership
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary
Natural logarithm o f average teacher
salary o f neighboring districts
Natural logarithm o f total property
tax value per student
Fraction American Indian

Fraction Hispanic

F
Number o f observation = 127

* P < 0.05

3.676978

1278.02501*
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While the regression coefficient o f percent black is 0.022523 in Table 15, the
same regression coefficient is 0.015721 in Table 17. Although there is some
difference between the two, it is not a statistically significant difference. Also, the
standard error o f the estimated coefficient is 0.018918 in Table 17, which is much
higher than that in Table 15 (0.007788). Thus, the regression coefficient o f the same
variable is less confident without the data o f the Portland school district. Therefore,
although the Portland school district makes a big influence in this case, the Portland
school district’s data must be included in the regression.
The fraction o f poor students, represented as the percent o f students in a
school district who are receiving free or subsidized lunch, also causes an increase in
total expenditure. A one-percent increase in such students causes approximately a
0.0034 percent increase in total expenditure, if all other things are held constant.50
According to Table 15, a one-percent increase in the fraction o f handicapped
students in the district causes approximately a 0.01 percent increase in total
expenditure, if all other things are held constant. For example, in FY 1993-94, the
La Grande school district had 321 handicapped students, 11.61 % o f its average daily
membership (2,764.6). That school district spent $12,468,526 in total expenditures in
the same year. If the percentage of handicapped students in this district increased by

50Because all independent variables, representing students' composition, are not
logarithm forms, one-unit change in fraction o f those students leads the amount o f
the regression coefficients percent increases in total expenditure. Here one-unit
change means a percent change, because a unit o f the independent variable is a
percentage.
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one percent (12.61 %) or number o f handicapped students increased by 28, the model
predicts this school district would have to spend $12,612,936 to maintain other
things the same with the same total enrollment.
Although I tried to obtain a cost function, the regression coefficients o f some
variables imply that it is not a cost function. First o f all, the regression coefficient o f
school output (average test score o f four grades) is not statistically significant at a
0.05 level. Second, the regression coefficient o f median household income
(0.100777), as well as the regression coefficient o f per student property tax value
(0.115677 and statistically significant), shows that the results in Table 15 do not
come from a true cost function. While Downes and Pogue (1994, 97-98) regard their
results as estimates o f a true cost function despite the regression coefficients o f
school outcomes not being statistically significant, it is questionable, since the
assumption o f a positive relationship between educational costs and educational
outcomes for the cost function is not met. Thus, the estimates o f the regression
coefficients in Table 15 appear to be based on expenditure rather than cost.
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CALCULATION OF THE COST DIFFERENTIALS

In the previous findings, it turned out that a cost function cannot be generated
with the Oregon school districts’ data. Thus, it is impossible to calculate the cost
differentials o f special education for handicapped students with the results in Table
15. However, it is useful to examine how the additional costs for handicapped
students is calculated in a cost function method. The processes described here are
based on the hypothesis that a true cost function is obtained.
The regression coefficient o f the fraction o f handicapped students is 0.011353
as shown in Table 15. This estimate comes from a cost function equation (6), where
the dependent variable is in natural logarithm form. Therefore, the coefficient of
0.011353 represents the percent change in total expenditure for a one-unit change in
the fraction o f handicapped students. Since the unit o f the fraction o f handicapped
students is a percentage, it can be said that each percentage o f the student body that is
handicapped causes an increase in total expenditure o f 1.1353 percent, holding all
other things constant.51
This number, however, represents the increase o f total expenditure due to
replacing non-handicapped students with handicapped students rather than the
increase in the number o f handicapped students. To know how much more money is

51We should be careful to recognize that 0.011353 is not a parameter but an estimate.
Actually, the 95 percent confidence interval for estimating the parameter o f the
percent o f handicapped students is 0.002479 and 0.020227.

96

needed for one additional handicapped student in some specific school districts, we
must know the additional costs for handicapped students in that school district. Due
to the various characteristics for each school district, the additional costs for
handicapped students are different. Therefore, we must calculate additional costs for
handicapped students for every school district.
Theoretically, the additional costs for handicapped students are the
differentials between the expenditure with handicapped students and the expenditure
without handicapped students. Thus, if we know the expenditure with handicapped
students and the expenditure without handicapped students (all other things are held
constant), we can calculate the additional expenditure for handicapped students for
every school district. In more detail, it can be calculated as follows:

1. Based on the cost function equation (6), I calculated the predicted total
expenditure o f each school district (predicted total expenditure).
2. I calculated the predicted total expenditure o f each school district if the fraction
o f handicapped students is zero (predicted total expenditure when the fraction of
handicapped students is zero). For example, if a school district with 1,000
average daily membership has 120 handicapped students (12 %), the predicted
total expenditure based on 1,000 average daily membership with 0 handicapped
student is calculated.
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3. I calculated the difference between the amount o f step 1 (predicted total
expenditure) and the amount o f step 2 (predicted total expenditure if all students
are non-handicapped students). It is the additional total cost for handicapped
students for each school district holding everything else constant.
4. I divided the amount calculated in step 3 by the number o f handicapped students,
which is the additional cost per handicapped student.

The formula to calculate the total additional costs for handicapped students can be
described as:

Total additional costs for handicapped students
= predicted total expenditure - predicted total expenditure when percentage
o f handicapped students is zero

Based on the above process, the additional costs for handicapped students in the
Lake Oswego school district can be calculated as follows:
In FY 1993-94, the Lake Oswego school district spent $32,817,280, which is
$4,912 per student (the Lake Oswego school district has 6,681.3 average daily
membership). Based on the estimated cost function parameters, the predicted
amount of total expenditure is $32,693,364 ($4,893 per student). If the Lake Oswego
school district did not have any handicapped students, which means all of the 6.681.3
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are regular students, it would have spent $29,077,459 in the same year holding
everything else constant. Therefore, due to 692 handicapped students (10.32 % of
ADM), the Lake Oswego school district would spend an additional $3,615,905.52
The school district would spend $4,352 per regular student and $9,577 per
handicapped student. In other words, on average, the Lake Oswego school district
would spend an additional $5,225 for every handicapped student.53 Table 18 shows
the predicted expenditures for regular and handicapped students based on the
estimates o f the regression in Table 15. Column three represents the predicted
expenditures per regular student, column four represents the predicted expenditure
per handicapped student, column five represents the predicted additional expenditure
per handicapped student, and column six represents the predicted expenditure per
student including regular and handicapped students together.

52$32.693,364 - $29,077,459 = $3,615,905.
” $3,615,905 7 692 = $5,225.
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TABLE 18
Predicted Expenditures per Student
based on a Cost Function Equation (6)

E xpenditure
per R egular
Student

E xpenditure
per
H andicapped
Student

A dditional
Expenditure
per
H andicapped
Student

Expenditure
per Student

C od e

D istrict

1005

Baker

3,919.38

8,674.07

4,754.68

4,528.68

1016

Huntington

5,366.43

11.066.57

5,700.14

5,827.36

1030

Burnt River

N /A

N /A

N/A

N/A

1061

Pine-Eagle

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

2007

A lsea

4,201.34

9,232.80

5,031.46

4,670.61

2017

Philomath

4.266.44

9,272.38

5,007.94

4,753.17

2025

Monroe

N /A

N /A

N/A

N/A

2509

Corvallis

4,070.42

8,975.86

4,905.45

4,567.34

3003

W est Linn

3,968.26

8,578.26

4,610.00

4.453.61

3007

Lake O sw ego

4,352.07

9,577.36

5,225.30

4,893.26

3012

North Clackmas

3,926.30

8,552.93

4,626.63

4,375.64

3035

M olalla River

3,697.58

8,212.65

4,515.07

4,251.02

3053

Colton

N /A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3062

Oregon City

3,836.07

8,166.26

4,330.18

4,411.86

3086

Canby

N /A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3108

Estacada

3,770.67

8,273.95

4,503.28

4,290.92

3115

Gladstone

4,302.66

8,940.44

4,637.78

4.859.76

4001

Astoria

4,156.20

9,152.98

4,996.78

4,668.09

4008

Jewell

5,219.32

12,696.44

7.477.12

6,030.50

4010

Seaside

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4030

Warrenton-

4,300.54

9,286.52

4,985.98

4.950.02

3,730.67

8,071.65

4.340.98

4.101.15

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Hamond
5001

Scappoose

5005

Columbia

100
5013

Rainier

4,513.27

9,842.02

5,328.74

5,029.05

5047

Vem onia

4,272.12

9,277.68

5,005.56

4,904.67

5502

St. Helens

3,956.71

8,660.51

4,703.80

4,447.33

6008

Coquille

3,929.96

8,782.64

4,852.67

4,462.46

6009

Coos Bay

3,832.02

8,573.65

4,741.63

4,406.37

6013

North Bend

3,870.24

8,683.20

4,812.96

4,344.03

6031

Powers

4,301.18

8,844.06

4,542.87

4.650.86

6041

Myrtle Point

3,947.20

8,877.43

4.930.22

4,451.24

6054

Bandon

4,571.22

9,943.70

5,372.48

5,054.57

7600

Crook CU

3,936.65

8,591.08

4,654.42

4,317.29

8002

Port Orford-

5,022.39

11,114.54

6,092.16

5,817.71

Langlois
8017

Brookings-Harbor

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

9001

Bend-La Pine

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

9002

Redmond

4,030.51

8,720.92

4,690.46

4,570.90

9006

Sisters

5,208.25

11,490.45

6,282.20

5,899.31

10001

Oakland

4,290.57

9,325.21

5,034.65

4,754.75

10004

Roseburg

3.748.88

8,244.29

4,495.41

4,309.38

10012

Glide

4.627.35

10,071.85

5.444.50

5,195.47

10015

Days Creek

5,271.82

11.652.20

6,380.38

5,700.84

10019

South Umpqua

3,580.54

8,170.31

4,589.77

4,299.26

10021

Camas Valley

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

10022

North Douglas

4,339.72

9,493.37

5.153.66

4.831.10

10032

Yoncalla

4.412.85

9,774.24

5.361.39

5.000.23

10034

Elkton

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

10070

Riddle

4,643.65

10,308.68

5,665.03

5.087.18

10077

Glendale

4,123.42

9,046.08

4,922.66

4.522.49

10105

Reedsport

4,402.19

9,900.85

5,498.66

4,932.21

10116

Winston-Dillard

4,121.58

9,061.53

4.939.94

4.681.46

10130

Sutherlin

4,107.32

8.933.68

4.826.37

4.808.09

11003

Arlington

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

11025

Condon

5,008.11

11.262.48

6.254.38

5,668.99

12003

John Day

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

101
12004

Prairie City

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

12008

Monument

4,834.08

10,896.39

6,062.31

5,614.94

12016

D ayville

5,539.23

11,590.61

6,051.38

6,040.04

12017

Long Creek

5,323.50

11,475.02

6,151.52

6,186.43

14001

Hood River

3,923.86

8,608.46

4,684.59

4,441.32

15004

Phoenix

4,187.08

9,167.60

4,980.52

4,653.55

15005

Ashland

4,307.78

9,545.40

5,237.62

4,801.89

15006

Central Point

3,877.41

8,400.83

4.523.42

4.309.20

15009

Eagle Point

3,679.59

8,147.04

4,467.45

4,159.50

15035

Rogue River

4,152.87

9,015.29

4,862.42

4,708.95

15059

Prospect

4,501.36

9,728.68

5,227.32

5,095.38

15091

Butte Falls

4,900.79

10,603.25

5,702.46

5,639.13

15549

Medford

3,663.48

7,929.19

4,263.71

4,051.20

16004

Culver

4,585.61

9,804.33

5.218.72

5,054.80

16509

Madras

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

17007

Grants Pass

4,032.37

8,468.83

4,436.46

4,308.85

17600

Three

4,011.54

8,625.49

4,613.95

4,488.84

4,053.92

8.951.62

4,897.70

4.604.03

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

5,764.81

12,238.29

6,473.49

6,400.09

N /A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Rivers/Josephine
18600

Klamath CU

19007

Lakeview

19011

Paisley

19014

North Lake

20001

Pleasant Hill

3,867.33

8,407.52

4,540.18

4,291.20

20004

Eugene

3,800.08

8,467.89

4,667.81

4.242.21

20019

Springfield

3,583.10

7,951.00

4,367.90

4,092.34

20028

Fem Ridge

3.933.79

8,760.43

4,826.64

4.510.63

20032

Mapleton

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

20040

Creswell

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

20045

South Lane

4,285.75

9.651.94

5.366.20

4,942.38

20052

Bethel

4,205.29

9,196.57

4,991.28

4,924.21

20066

Crow-Applegate-

5.072.63

11,326.03

6.253.41

5.887.02

5.045.85

11.264.56

6.218.72

5.927.24

Loran
20068

M cKenzie

20069

Junction City

4,108.67

9,158.15

5,049.48

4,557.41

20071

Lowell

4.179.65

9,096.76

4,917.11

4,951.91

20076

Oakridge

N/A

N /A

N/A

N /A

20079

Marcola

4,681.09

10,530.70

5,849.61

5,4 2 2 .4 0

20090

Blachly

5,471.21

12,604.14

7,132.93

6,6 61.68

20097

Siuslaw

4,665.31

10,164.66

5.499.35

5,080.90

21600

Lincoln CU

4,028.74

8,791.02

4,762.28

4,5 4 7 .1 7

22008

Greater Albany

3,803.52

8,418.78

4,615.26

4,355.31

22016

Lebanon

N /A

N /A

N/A

N /A

22055

Sweet Home

3,883.31

8,665.53

4,782.22

4 ,4 56.63

22095

Scio

4,264.52

9,223.25

4,958.74

4 ,9 5 4 .3 6

22129

Mill City-Gates

N /A

N/A

N/A

N/A

22552

Central Linn

5,011.90

11,042.67

6,030.77

5,514.99

23003

Jordan Valley

5,173.78

11,460.50

6,286.72

6 ,1 7 0 .8 4

23008

Ontario

3,915.42

8,657.96

4,742.54

4,4 47.72

23026

N yssa

3,849.71

8,539.55

4,689.84

4,4 3 1 .8 0

23061

Adrian

4,679.56

10,045.55

5,365.99

5,136.84

23066

Harper

5,405.56

11,686.41

6,280.85

6 ,2 8 6 .4 7

23084

Vale

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

24001

Gervais

N /A

N /A

N/A

N/A

24005

Cascade

N /A

N /A

N/A

N /A

24014

Jefferson

4,170.52

9,233.82

5,063.30

4 ,8 4 7 .9 7

24015

North Marion

4,244.40

9,338.18

5,093.78

4 ,6 4 6 .1 6

24024

Salem -K eizer

3,363.78

7,406.01

4,042.24

3.764.85

24045

St. Paul

4.319.65

9,494.04

5,174.39

4 ,7 8 6 .4 8

24091

Mt. Angel

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

24103

Woodbum

4,172.09

8,985.77

4,813.69

4,6 1 2 .2 5

25001

Morrow

4,353.41

9,615.90

5,262.49

4 ,8 0 7 .6 0

26001

Portland

5,232.43

11,579.83

6,347.40

5,822.30

26003

Parkrose

5,163.01

11,362.69

6,199.67

5,790.50

26007

Reynolds

4.293.99

9,384.67

5.090.68

4 .8 5 8 .8 4

26010

Gresham-Barlow

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

26028

Centennial

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
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26039

Corbett

4,360.16

9,445.39

5,085.23

4 ,8 8 3 .0 3

26040

David Douglas

4,148.81

9,114.07

4,965.27

4 ,7 1 8 .3 7

27002

Dallas

3,738.17

8,361.59

4,623.42

4 ,3 2 7 .4 5

27013

Central

3,644.69

8,092.83

4,448.14

4 ,1 9 6 .2 6

27021

Perrydale

4,799.51

9,434.67

4,635.16

5 ,0 77.18

27057

Falls City

N/A

N/A

N/A

N /A

28001

Sherman County

N/A

N/A

N/A

N /A

3,874.94

8,525.56

4,650.61

4 ,4 2 5 .4 3

SD
29009

Tillam ook

29056

Neah-K ah-Nie

N /A

N /A

N/A

N /A

29101

Nestucca Valley

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

30001

Helix

5,021.11

11,421.69

6,400.58

5,902.35

30002

Pilot Rock

4,130.10

9,264.56

5,134.46

4 ,8 0 4 .3 6

30005

Echo

4,608.58

10,025.39

5,416.81

5,117.33

30006

Umatilla

3,431.42

7,773.01

4,341.58

3 ,9 99.68

30007

Milton-Freewater

N/A

N /A

N/A

N /A

30008

Hermiston

3.735.91

8,199.21

4,463.30

4 ,2 2 5 .8 7

30016

Pendleton

3.713.99

8,178.62

4,464.63

4 ,1 8 1 .5 8

30029

Athena-W eston

4,274.81

9.274.05

4,999.23

4 ,7 3 9 .8 9

30061

Stanfield

3,942.69

9,028.66

5,085.97

4,5 4 3 .6 3

30080

Ukiah

7,146.36

13,869.61

6,723.25

7,7 1 6 .1 2

31001

La Grande

3,845.63

8,618.74

4,773.11

4 ,3 9 9 .8 4

31005

Union

4.576.06

10,250.66

5,674.60

5,156.33

31008

North Powder

4,581.68

9,722.84

5,141.16

5 ,1 4 4 .6 6

31011

Imbler

4,406.01

9,391.84

4.985.83

4 ,9 2 4 .7 5

31015

Cove

4,447.90

10,209.28

5,761.38

4,7 8 5 .0 7

31023

Elgin

4,058.85

9,446.75

5,387.90

4 ,8 0 8 .7 9

32006

Joseph

4,892.33

10,858.69

5,966.36

5 ,6 38.29

32012

W allowa

4,489.25

9,777.45

5,288.21

5.246.71

32021

Enterprise

4,613.63

9,864.94

5,251.31

4 ,9 5 0 .4 2

33009

Chenowith

4.423.14

9,849.65

5,426.51

5,089.51

33012

The Dalles

3,981.58

9.247.24

5,265.66

4.624.13

33029

Dufur

N/A

N/A

N/A

N'A

34013

Banks

4,311.53

9,432.68

5,121.15

4,941.78

34015

Forest Grove

3,927.56

8,599.04

4,671.48

4,445.36

34023

Tigard-Tualatin

3,989.52

8,573.96

4,584.43

4,459.39

34048

Beaverton

3,984.73

8,664.06

4,679.32

4,432.17

34088

Sherwood

4,282.40

9,132.91

4,850.52

4,820.40

34511

Gaston

N /A

N /A

N/A

N/A

35001

Spray

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

35021

Fossil

N/A

N /A

N/A

N/A

35055

Mitchell

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

36001

Yamhill-Carlton

3,738.38

8,425.19

4,641.81

4,542.72

36004

Amity

4,018.15

8,828.21

4,810.07

4,667.56

36008

Dayton

4,126.68

9,085.10

4,958.42

4,760.11

36029

Newberg

3,838.53

8,457.86

4,619.33

4,327.18

36030

Wiliam ina

3,694.92

8,258.05

4,563.13

4,301.53

36040

M cM innville

3,779.78

8,200.12

4,420.34

4,232.99

36048

Sheridan

3,999.87

8,704.02

4,704.15

4,679.45
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According to thf* results in Table 18, the average ratio o f expenditure per
handicapped student to expenditure per regular student is 2.19.54 Because this
number is likely to be based on expenditure rather than cost, it will be useful to
compare this result with the actual student cost weight for special education. Table
19 shows the weighted student counts for the Salem school district for 1993-94 based
on the new formula.

54$9.439.48 (average o f the predicted expenditure per handicapped student) /
$4,305.00 (average o f the predicted expenditure per regular student) = 2.192678.
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TABLE 1955
Weighted Student Count for the Salem School District
for 1993-94

N um ber o f students

W eight

W eighted total

29,328.6

1.0

29,328.6

ESL additional

1,515.7

0.5

757.9

Special education

2,961

1.0

2,961.0

88.5

1.0

88.5

0

1.0-2.0

0

4 ,55 7 .3 5S

0.25

1.139.3

F actor
June’94 Actual ADM r

Pregnant & Parenting
Rem ote school
Students in poverty
Total AD M w

34.275.3

55It is based on Final Calculations o f the State School Fund Grant fo r 1993-94.
Oregon Department o f Education. May 5, 1995.
56The count for the students in poverty is based on the 1990 census data then
adjusted by the number o f students participated in reduced price school lunch
programs.
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The additional weight o f 1.0 for special education in Table 19, thus 2.0
student cost weight, is very similar to the average ratio o f expenditure per
handicapped student to expenditure per regular student (2.19) calculated from Table
18. Also, the cost weight for the students in poverty in Table 19 is 1.25, which is
very close to the ratio o f expenditure per poor student to expenditure per regular
student (1.33).57
In Table 1 5 ,1 found that the increase in total expenditure is less than
proportional to the increase o f enrollment. The question is whether it implies the
economies o f scale or the reflection o f the funding formula. According to the remote
school factor o f the formula, students enrolled in a remote small (250 or fewer)
school receive a higher weight up to a maximum o f 2.0. Although it is very difficult
to examine the result o f the regression with the funding formula like the above two
cases, due in part to the lack o f information, and due in part to the various weights
according to the size o f school,58 the regression coefficient for average daily
membership (0.905911) in Table 15 also can be explained by the funding formula,
which gives more money per student to the very small schools.

57By using the same method used to calculate the additional costs for handicapped
students in the previous chapter, the additional costs for poor students can be
calculated. The average ratio o f expenditure per poor student to expenditure per
regular student is 1.33.
58The weight for remote school factor is based on the size o f each school, not the size
o f a school district.
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The above comparison indicates that the estimates o f the regression show the
close similarities to the student cost weights o f the formula. This implies that the
school districts simply spend the money given them with no discernible effect on
measured outputs.
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COMPARISON OF TWO FUNDING FORMULAS

From the previous findings, the results o f the regression (Table 15) are likely
to reflect the present distribution funding formula. For more investigation in terms
o f this issue, I compared these results with the results based on the same regression
model but FY 1989-90 data, which is just before Measure 5. Since there was a
significant change in the state distribution formula between them, the comparison
can imply whether districts’ spendings are affected by the formula. Table 20 shows
estimates o f a cost function (6) using FY 1989-90 data.59 For the convenience o f the
comparison, the estimates o f the same cost function using FY 1993-94 data are
shown in column three and column five.

59Due to the lack o f data, only five variables (total expenditure, average daily
membership, percent o f handicapped students, average teacher salary, and median
household income) o f FY 1989-90 are used in the regression.
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TABLE 20
Comparison of Estimates of Cost Function Parameters
based on FY 1989-90 and FY 1993-94 data
Dependent V ariable: Natural Logarithm of Total Expenditure
Variables
Average scale score o f grade 3, 5,
8, and 11
Natural logarithm o f median
household incom e
Fraction o f resident graduated
high school or higher
Natural logarithm o f average
daily membership
Natural logarithm o f average
teacher salary
Natural logarithm o f average
teacher salary o f neighboring
districts
Natural logarithm o f total
property tax value per student
Fraction American Indian

Regression Coefficients
FY 1993-94
FY 1989-90

t-value
FY 1989-90
FY 1993-94

0.005523

0.006012

0.799

0.911

0.118371

0.100777

1.350

1.313

-0 .0 0 0 6 1 7

-0 .0 0 0 1 0 7

- 0.235

- 0.044

0.877875

0.905911

66.421*

72.649*

0.670005

0.372881

4.266*

2.511*

-0 .1 3 6 0 2 5

-0 .2 4 1 7 8 8

- 0.898

- 1.595

0.125568

0.115677

4.219*

3.948*

0.001207

-0 .0 0 1 9 9 6

0.395

- 0.532

Fraction black

0.027875

0.022523

3.158*

2.892*

Fraction A sian/Pacific Islander

0.013292

0.011582

1.850

1.832

-0 .0 0 1 4 9 1

-0 .0 0 1 1 0 7

- 1.136

- 0.925

Fraction handicapped

0.000109

0.011353

0.033

2.532*

Fraction receiving subsidized
lunch

0.002273

0.003360

2.660*

4.304*

Fraction receiving vocational
education
Constant

0.001440

0.000291

0.919

0.210

-0 .2 8 4 4 1 1

3.743056

R-square

0.99265

0.99421

Adjusted R-square

0.99181

0.99350

1186.71804*

1387.08910

Fraction Hispanic

F
Number o f observation = 138

* P < 0.05
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The regression coefficient o f average test score o f four grades is 0.005523
and is not statistically significant. Also, there are no big differences in the other
regression coefficients between the two models except the regression coefficient o f
percent o f handicapped students and the regression coefficient o f average teacher
salary. The regression coefficient o f percent o f handicapped students is 0.000109
and is not statistically significant.60 The regression coefficient o f average teacher
salary is 0.670005, which is much higher than that o f FY 1993-94, and is statistically
significant. Again, the results do not show any difference in terms o f the relationship
between school output and education cost.
There may be some reasons why the relationship between the percent o f
handicapped students and the cost o f education does not appear in the regression
analysis. First, it may come from a measurement error due to the lack o f FY 1989-90
data in some variables. It would be most significant in the case o f test scores.
Because most handicapped students did not take common assessment tests until
1990-91,1 used the test scores o f FY 1993-94. This can be a problem because there
is some variation o f the percent of handicapped students in the districts in the two
periods. Although most variables are stable during 1989 through 1994, the percent
o f handicapped students has changed. The correlation coefficient o f the percent of
handicapped students between FY 1989-90 and FY 1993-94 is only 0.3687.
Measurement error can result in biased estimates o f regression coefficients.

60The t-value o f the percent o f handicapped students is 0.033.

Second, there was a significant change in the method to distribute state aids
for handicapped students in FY 1991-92. Since the method to distribute state money
for handicapped students changed from the percent reimbursement method to pupil weight method in FY 1991-92, the spending for handicapped students in some
districts might not reflect the percentage o f handicapped students, and in turn it may
show up in this regression.
Third, the relationship between the percent o f handicapped students and cost
o f education simply may not be strong enough to show up in the regression analysis.
If school districts spend all o f the money they receive from the legislature, but there
is no statistically significant effect on measures o f achievement in the short run, then
the statistical results represent more o f an expenditure function than a cost function.
The search for a more definitive explanation should be addressed in the future.
Table 20 shows that there is a big difference in the regression coefficient o f
average teacher salary between the estimates based on FY 1989-90 and FY 1993-94
data. Higher regression coefficient o f average teacher salary in FY 1989-90 indicates
that the average teacher salary was more important factor to determine total
expenditure in FY 1989-90 than in FY 1993-94. This is because there was a change
in the teacher experience adjustment in the new formula from FY 1990-91. Before
the new formula, there was no teacher experience adjustment factor in the state
distribution formula, and all school districts paid teacher salaries according to their
own pay schedules, which are based in part on teacher experience. After the new
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formula, school districts partially use the teacher experience adjustment, which is
included in the new formula to adjust for cost differences.61 Although, due to the
maintenance o f hold-harmless level, the teacher experience adjustment o f the new
formula was not fully in effect for all districts, there could be some change in teacher
salary under the new formula.
The results from FY 1989-90 data show that the estimated coefficients are
different under a different funding formula. In other words, the regression
coefficients in Table 15 appear to reflect the funding formula and no conclusions can
be drawn regarding the relationship other than that school districts spend the money
given them.

61However, this cost factor is not applied to all school districts due to the
maintenance o f hold-harmless level.

SUMMARY

The empirical results for a cost function equation (6) indicate that the
estimates o f the regression coefficients do not come from a cost function. The
positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between school output (test score)
and school expenditure in the regression, shows that it is not possible to estimate cost
differentials o f special education for handicapped students using a cost function
method with this data. Moreover, the comparisons o f the results in Table 15 with the
actual student cost weights and with the same regression model using the 1989-90
data indicate that the school districts simply spend the money given them without the
consideration o f school output. Thus, the described processes to calculate the
additional costs for handicapped students can only be practical if a true cost function
is obtained. In the final chapter, policy implications in terms o f the application o f a
cost function method in the state policy arena as well as possible reasons o f not
obtaining a cost function, are discussed.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

I found no statistically significant relationship between the educational output
(represented as test scores) and total education costs. This can be explained by two
reasons. First and most likely, there may be no relationship between school
expenditure and outputs in the short run. The school districts may simply spend the
money they received from the state on items that do not affect outcomes directly, i. e.
athletic programs, or expenditures may not generate a statistically significant effect
on outputs. For example, they may spend more money for smaller classes, but the
smaller classes may not affect achievement on standardized tests. Second, it may
come from the measurement error such as the use o f imprecise measures o f school
outcomes. It is difficult to measure school outcomes precisely. In this study, the
average scale score o f grades 3, 5, 8, and 11 was used as a measure for school output.
However, some other measures such as the dropout ratio and the graduation rate also
can represent school output. The exclusion o f these variables might cause a
measurement error. Another possibility in terms o f measurement error is the
proportion o f handicapped students participating in the statewide tests. Although all
students are required to take the statewide tests, some severely handicapped students
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might not take the tests. Furthermore, the distribution o f such severely handicapped
students are different among districts, so it might cause a measurement error. The
result o f the comparison between the regression coefficients o f the regression and the
present funding formula indicates that the former is more plausible reason.
Although this study did not generate a cost function using Oregon school
districts’ data, it provides some policy implications. One important policy issue in
terms o f education finance is economies o f scale. If an increase in enrollment causes
a decrease in cost per student, the large school district can provide the same level of
education with less money per student. However, this study could not prove whether
economies o f scale exist in Oregon school district. Since the state formula gives
more money per student to the very small schools, the finding in the regression might
be explained by the present funding formula.
In addition to economies o f scale, we should consider the other issue for
school financing. According to various studies (Chanbers 1978, Welding 1981,
W entzler 1981) to construct education cost indices, the education price indices are
higher in urban and metropolitan areas than in rural areas. Generally, large urbanarea school districts and small, geographically isolated districts pay more for
comparable educational services than their statewide counterparts in suburban and
rural areas. Because education is a labor-intense industry with nearly 80 percent of
the operating budget used for personnel, the total school district budget is greatly
influenced by changes in personnel costs. Variations in districts’ costs can be mainly
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attributed to local cost-of-living differences associated with both wage and salary
differences.62 Several states include cost adjustments in their funding formula, e.g.
Alaska, Florida, Ohio, and Texas.
However, as this study shows, the costs o f the services per student
representing the combinations o f inputs, such as equipment, space, and students, are
generally lower in large districts than small districts because o f economies o f scale.
Because rural districts tend to be small and urban districts tend to be large, and to the
degree that scale economies are important, service cost differentials and input cost
differentials will work to offset each other to some degree.63 If these differentials
work to offset each other, the state might be best advised to make no adjustment for
costs at all. The best way to investigate the above issue is using both a control
variable representing cost-of-living and a variable representing enrollment in a cost
function. The results o f a cost function can provide some information about whether
these differentials work to offset each other or not, for better designing state
distribution formulas. However, it is very difficult to accurately measure cost-ofliving in general and cost-of-living formulas for teachers in particular. Average
family income often is used as a proxy for cost-of-living, for example, but it also

62Gess, Larry R., Paul A. Montello, David L. Sjoquist, and John F. Sears. (1995).
“Public School Finance: A Rational Response to Reform Pressures,” Paper Prepared
for Presentation Eighty-Eighth annual Conference on Taxation. National Tax
Association.
63There are some exceptions in this tendency, however, for example, the Parkrose
school district, which is small but located in urban area.
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may be argued that average income reflects socioeconomic status or wages and
salaries in other local industries. The absence o f data about cost-of-living differences
by school district makes it impossible to directly address this question.
The method used to calculate the additional costs o f special education for
handicapped students can be applied in calculating the additional costs o f other
special education features such as the additional costs for poor students. The
regression coefficient o f the fraction o f poor students is 0.00336 and is statistically
significant at a 0.05 level (Table 15). By using the same method used to calculate
the additional costs for handicapped students in the previous chapter, the additional
costs for poor students o f every school district can be calculated.64 For example, the
additional costs for poor students in the Lake Oswego school district based on the
cost function model would be $1,633 per poor student (FY 1993-94).
The other issue in terms o f policy implications is how to calculate cost for
school districts that do not have all grades. For example, some school districts are
missing from the calculation because they have only grades 1-6, while some school
districts are missing due to missing data. The former cases are serious in terms o f
cost calculation, if those school districts are included in the cost function, because
school outcomes o f those school districts may not be consistent with others. One
way to calculate costs for these school districts is to use the test scores o f one or two

64The application o f this method is possible if a true cost function is obtained.
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grades instead o f the average o f all four grades (3, 5, 8 and 11 grades) as school
outcome.
If this cost function method were used, it would create an incentive for school
districts to increase their funding in terms o f input price factor. For example,
because the average teacher salary is an important factor to decide education cost for
school districts, school districts may increase their teachers’ salaries to obtain more
money from the state government. To prevent this, it is desirable to establish the
overall cost indices for teacher salary.
A cost function method depends basically on a multiple regression equation.
Although a regression analysis is a robust statistical method,65 we cannot eliminate a
rule o f confidence interval for the estimates o f regression coefficients.66 For
example, the regression coefficient o f the percent o f handicapped students is
0.011353 and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level in Table 15. But, statistically,
the chance that the true parameter o f the percent o f handicapped students is in the
interval between 0.00247967 and 0.02022768 is 95 percent. In other words, the
estimates o f the regression are not perfectly accurate numbers. Thus, one must use
care in applying the results from a regression model to real policy.

65It means the parameter estimates are not meaningfully influenced by violations o f
the assumptions.
66Since sampling theory makes it clear that every estimate involves some estimation
error, it is useful to provide information regarding the value of point estimate.
670.0113 5 3 - 1.979 x 0.004484 (standard error).
680.011353 + 1.979 x 0.004484 (standard error).
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In the application o f a cost function method to the real policy arena, the state
government must resolve the problems in terms o f school districts’ behavior. It
would not be surprising that school districts may maximize subsidy rather than
minimize cost. If it is the case, it is difficult to generate a cost function due to the
absence o f the relationship between educational costs and outcomes. The
development o f effective audits is required to prevent this, although it will increase
the state’s budget.
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LIM ITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION

The results o f this study are disappointing. The empirical data does not
generate the estimates o f a true cost function. Among the various reasons, the most
reasonable interpretation o f the results is that the school districts spend the money
given them with no discernible effect on measured outcomes. For clearer
explanation in terms o f this issue, follow-up studies are recommended.
First, more data must be included in a cost function, especially the measures
for educational output such as graduation and dropout ratios as well as some omitted
data such as the percent o f ESL students and talented and gifted students and the
variable representing cost-of-living differences among school districts.
Second, identifying the exact spending on some specific educational
programs by the school districts will make clear the pattern o f how the school
districts spend the money the state gives them.
As this study shows, it is very difficult to obtain a true cost function in the
public sector, especially in the public education area. Unlike the private sector, the
assumption o f cost minimization is rarely met in the public sector. Due in part to the
problem in terms o f cost minimization, and due in part to the complexity o f
measuring educational outputs precisely, the relationship between input (spending)
and output is not clear in the education area. Therefore, it is very difficult to make a
cost function in the public education arena. If a true cost function were not obtained.
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the application o f a cost function method to educational financing is not feasible.
Although a cost function method is a challenging way to calculate cost differentials
o f special education for handicapped students, the application o f this method to the
real situation is skeptical, at least at this time.
The educational financing in Oregon is still in transition since the passage of
Measure 5. For example, the role o f property tax revenues will be decreasing during
the next few years, though its role is still significant in this study. It would be
interesting to compare the results between this study and the future ones. Also, it
would be a good opportunity to investigate the changing pattern o f educational
financing in Oregon.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study tried to calculate the cost differentials o f special education for
handicapped students o f 128 school districts in Oregon where information and data
are available based on a cost function method. The empirical results based on the
Oregon school districts' data in FY 1993-94 show that there is a statistically
significant relationship between handicapped students and education expenditure.
Also, the results show that the increase o f total expenditure is less than proportional
to the increase o f enrollment, which implies economies o f scale. However, since the
regression coefficient o f school output (test score) is not statistically significant,
these results do not appear to result from a true cost relationship.
Among the several plausible explanations for the statistical results, the most
reasonable interpretation is that they simply reflect the funding formula for the
school districts set by the State Legislature. This is because the regression
coefficients o f some key variables are very close to the factors in the present
distribution formula. Also, the comparison o f these results with the same regression
model but using 1989-90 data indicates that the estimated coefficients are different
under a different funding formula. The state funding formula may also explain the
regression coefficient for average daily membership o f the regression, which implies
economies o f scale, since the state funding formula gives more money per student to
the very small schools. In other words, the state distribution formula appears to be

more important in determining expenditure differences than the true cost differences.
The other plausible interpretation is that a measurement error may result in a biased
regression coefficient o f educational outcome.
The difficulty o f generating a true cost function makes a cost function method
problematic for determining a state’s distribution formula. While some studies
indicate that a cost function method can be applied to determine appropriate state aid
levels for particular educational programs, in the absence o f a statistically significant
relationship between educational inputs and outputs, it is questionable whether this
procedure identifies true cost differences. In this case, some other methods, such as
the resource-cost model, should be investigated.
In conclusion, while a cost function appears to be a good way to determine
cost differences, in practice, changes in educational output are not sensitive enough
to changes in inputs in the short run to make this a reliable method to determine
funding formulas. It implies it is very difficult, if not impossible, to apply a cost
function method to determine appropriate state funding distributions.
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APPENDIX

Oregon Statewide Assessment and Special Education Students69

In the school year 1990-91. Oregon began a new system of evaluating
student performance. By testing students in reading, writing, mathematics and
science, the Oregon Department o f Education hopes to gain a clearer picture o f
student performance to help students, parents, teachers and schools improve student
performance.
Oregon’s statewide assessment system is criterion referenced, meaning a
student’s performance is evaluated against predetermined standards. Oregon’s
testing system is based on specific curriculum objectives o f Oregon schools. Panels
o f Oregon educators design the tests and ensure they reflect curriculum goals adopted
by the State Board o f Education.
Federal regulation under the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973, Section 504, requires
that handicapped individuals be given equal opportunity to participate in and benefit
from any program or activity customarily granted to all individuals. Thus, all
handicapped students should be considered eligible for inclusion in the Oregon

69 This section is based on Administration Manual o f Oregon Statewide Assessment
in 1996 issued by the Oregon Department o f Education.
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Statewide Assessment Program, unless they are individually exempted based on the
characteristics o f their instructional program. Each student must be considered
individually and not on the basis o f the category o f handicap.
Special education students enrolled in regular education (mainstream classes)
are typically exposed to the curriculum contained on the Oregon Content Standards
and, therefore, should participate in the assessment program under standard
conditions in the regular education (mainstream) classes. In addition, some special
education students may be able to participate in this assessment program under
modified conditions. Individuals who participate in the Oregon Statewide
Assessment Program under modified testing conditions will have their tests scored
and returned to the district but these scores will not be included in the school’s
averages or other group results. Special education students, whether in a mainstream
or self-contained classroom, should be exempted from testing when their
instructional program does not include significant instruction in the Oregon Content
Standards at the grade level being tested. This applies to each test and should be
decided by those teachers and other professional staff responsible for the
development o f the students.
All ESL/Bilingual education students should be considered eligible for
inclusion in the Oregon Statewide Assessment Program, unless they are individually
exempted based on documented evidence o f their limited proficiency in English.
Each student must be considered individually.

